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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-HELP
ELIZABETH L. MACDOWELL*
Self-help programs are conceptualized as alternatives to attorney
representation that can help both courts and unrepresented litigants.1
The rhetoric of self-help also typically includes empowering unrepre-
sented individuals to help themselves.2 But how do self-help programs
respond to litigants’ efforts at self-advocacy? This Article reports find-
ings from a study of courthouse self-help programs assisting unrep-
resented litigants applying for protection orders. The central finding
is that self-help staff members were not neutral in the provision of
services despite a professed ethic of neutrality. Using the sociological
concept of demeanor, this Article shows that staff members rewarded
protection order applicants who conformed to stereotypes about do-
mestic violence victims and responded negatively to litigants who
raised questions or sought assistance outside the scope of narrowly
defined services. Staff members also failed to provide assistance with
important economic remedies and de-prioritized safety planning and
referrals to vital antiviolence services. In these and other ways, staff
members influenced what relief was sought and by whom. This find-
ing is especially troubling given the overarching goals of domestic
violence protection orders to increase safety and empower low-income
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ReportNationalEdition.pdf [http://perma.cc/2GQ5-9UM9].
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women, and has broad implications for studying access to justice and
law and social movements. This Article also contributes to the anal-
ysis of demeanor by expanding previous typologies with the addition
of two new categories: token supportive demeanor, and apathetic
demeanor. These additions further account for how authority is dis-
played in legal settings, and how law is implemented through every-
day interactions as well as formal decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-help services3 have been proliferating as a way to address
what is sometimes characterized as a crisis of self-representation in
the courts.4 Going to court without a lawyer is especially common in
family law cases, where eighty percent or more of litigants appear
in court unrepresented in some jurisdictions.5 In this context, courts
3. I use the term self-help to refer to legal services that expressly do not involve an
attorney-client relationship, regardless of whether or not the services are provided or
supervised by attorneys or by non-attorneys. Self-help services under this definition may
involve one-on-one assistance with completing and filing forms, as well as electronic and
software-based services. See GREACEN, supra note 1, at 3 (summarizing information re-
sources provided to self-represented litigants by courts); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
supra note 2 (listing examples of self-help resources offered by courts). Some of these ser-
vices may closely resemble services that involve a limited form of attorney representation,
such as brief advice sessions or ghost writing. The scope of potential self-help services
overlaps with that of unbundled or limited scope legal services provided by attorneys, and
is often part of a triage or multipronged approach to service delivery that may include
representation (e.g., at a subsequent hearing or other aspect of the case). See Jessica K.
Steinberg, In Pursuit of Justice? Case Outcomes and the Delivery of Unbundled Legal
Services, 18 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 466–70 (2011) (discussing forms of unbun-
dled legal services and limited scope representation).
4. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revis-
iting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 1987 (1999)
(describing the “variety of assistance programs, developed by bar associations, legal ser-
vices offices, and the courts themselves, [that] have sprung up in many settings in response
to the ‘pro se crisis’ ”); see also Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil Gideon (And for Pro Se
Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1274 (2010) (discussing the rise in pro se litigation);
Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis and
its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 45–46 (2011) (reporting judges’ perceptions that increas-
ing numbers of people are representing themselves in foreclosure, family law, housing,
and consumer cases, and that unrepresented parties experience worse outcomes, and are
burdening the courts); U.S. BANKR. COURT, C.D. CAL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CRISIS: SELF-
REPRESENTED PARTIES AND THE COURT (2011), http://ecf-ciao.cacb.uscourts.gov/Commu
nications/prose/annualreport/2011/ProSeAnnual%20Report2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/UEU2
-E5MZ] (identifying serving pro se litigants as one of the bankruptcy court’s “key strate-
gic issues”); JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION:
A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 49 (1998) (“Court managers
believe that the volume of cases involving self-represented litigants has increased sub-
stantially in recent years.”); Dave Stafford, Dickson: Trial Courts Face ‘Crisis’ of Unrep-
resented Litigants, THE INDIANA LAWYER (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer
.com/dickson-trial-courts-face-crisis-of-unrepresented-litigants/PARAMS/article/32635
[http://perma.cc/TE7F-SKX7].
5. See JOHN M. GREACEN, SELF REPRESENTED LITIGANTS AND COURT AND LEGAL
SERVICES RESPONSES TO THEIR NEEDS: WHAT WE KNOW 3–6 (2002), http://www.courts
.ca.gov/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow [http://perma.cc/CT6W-K87W]. Several
states have researched self-represented litigants. In many instances, both parties to the
case are without counsel. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA TASK FORCE ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, STATEWIDE ACTION PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITI-
GANTS 2 (2004) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA ACTION PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS], http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/selfreplitsrept.pdf [http://perma.cc/39TC
-YL8U] (reporting up to 72% of family law litigants in California courts are unrepresented
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around the country have been maintaining or increasing self-help
services even as overall operating budgets are shrinking,6 often in
partnership with nongovernmental organizations.7 Self-help clinics
or centers assisting unrepresented litigants are increasingly promoted
as a way to empower individuals to help themselves, and help courts
to manage crowded dockets and improve trust and confidence in the
courts.8 Despite how these services are expanding, there has been
next to no empirical research on self-help.9 This Article addresses
this gap by presenting and discussing findings from a study focusing
on interactions between staff and protection order applicants at self-
help programs located in county courthouses in two western states.10
This is the first comparative and evaluative research project to ex-
amine courthouse self-help centers assisting self-represented liti-
gants with civil domestic violence claims.
at filing; up to 96% of paternity cases are unrepresented at disposition); OFF. OF THE
DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUST. INITIATIVES, SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: CHAR-
ACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES: THE RESULTS OF TWO SURVEYS 1 (2005) [hereinafter NEW
YORK CITY: RESULTS OF TWO SURVEYS] (reporting that 75% of litigants appearing in New
York City Family Court were unrepresented); see also Jane C. Murphy, Access to Legal
Remedies: The Crisis in Family Law, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 123, 124–25 (1993) (reporting the
results of a District of Columbia study finding 93% of defendants in child support enforce-
ment cases, where potential sanctions include incarceration, were unrepresented).
6. CALIFORNIA ACTION PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS, supra note
5, at 1 (Court-based staffed self-help centers, supervised by attorneys, are the optimum
way for courts to facilitate the timely and cost-effective processing of cases involving self-
represented litigants, to increase access to the courts and improve delivery of justice to the
public.); see ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & THE CTS., CALIFORNIA
COURTS SELF-HELP CENTERS: REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 1–2 (2007)
[hereinafter REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE], http://www.courts.ca.gov/docu
ments/rpt_leg_self_help.pdf [http://perma.cc/CF5W-YYPE] (reporting increased budget
allocations to support development of self-help centers). But see Tim Cory, California
Courts’ New Funding Formula: The Workload Allocation Funding Methodology, CAL. COM-
MON SENSE (Sept. 5, 2014), http://cacs.org/research/california-courts-wafm-assessment
[http://perma.cc/DE4A-ZSPM] (reporting that San Francisco’s county court system cut civil
self-help services by 50% due to funding cuts).
7. See REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, supra note 6, at 5–8 (reporting on
results of efforts to encourage court-community partnerships and collaborations to provide
self-help services).
8. See NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., A DIRECTORY OF COURT-BASED SELF HELP PROGRAMS
2 (2006), http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/accessfair/id/321 [http://perma
.cc/P463-KHJP] (listing a directory of approximately 150 self-help programs in the
United States).
9. See Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
295, 297 (2010); Sande L. Buhai, Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Compar-
ative Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 993 (2009); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 120–21 (2004).
10. See infra Part I discussing protection order remedies. Protection orders are some-
times referred to as restraining orders by scholars and in legislation; the term protection
order is used throughout this Article for the purpose of consistency.
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A. Domestic Violence Self-Help Centers
Domestic violence self-help centers are an important location
for study for several reasons. First, they are a critical intervention in
domestic violence cases. Civil protection orders are one of the most
commonly used legal remedies for domestic violence, second only to
calling 911.11 This is often a time of crisis for survivors, and may be
the survivor’s first encounter with the court system.12 Past research
has found that encounters with the legal system in this context are
pivotal in the development of a subjective understanding of oneself as
a rights bearing individual who can invoke or enlist the power of the
state for protective intervention.13 Self-help centers are at the front
lines of unrepresented survivors’ interactions with the legal system.
The results of this interaction have implications for survivors’ long-
term safety, and also for the evolution of social movements dedicated
to anti-domestic violence work.14
Second, many self-help centers serve populations that are espe-
cially vulnerable to violence due to marginalization on multiple
intersecting grounds, including race and/or ethnicity, gender, class,
education, and language.15 While women are much more likely than
11. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can
Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1489 (2008); see Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System Responses to Domestic Vio-
lence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management and Technology Solutions,
in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: POLICIES, PROGRAMS,
AND LEGAL REMEDIES 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (reporting that survivors use
civil protection orders more often than the criminal justice system to address domestic
violence); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181867,
EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM
THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 52, 55 (2000) (determining that each
year, approximately 17% of the 1.5 million female survivors of domestic violence obtain civil
protection orders).
12. See THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH GROUP: UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, EVALUATION OF THE
VAN NUYS LEGAL SELF-HELP CENTER FINAL REPORT 3 (2001) [hereinafter VAN NUYS FINAL
REPORT], http://courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/Final_Evaluation_Van_Nuys_SHC2001
.doc [http://perma.cc/525M-6NNP] (reporting that most people using the self-help center
were first-time visitors with no prior court experience).
13. See Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing
Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 343, 345 (2003).
14. See id. at 346; see also infra Part I.A (discussing the historical roots of protection
order legislation in the battered women’s movement).
15. For example, a study of self-help centers provided through court-community
partnerships in California found that almost two-thirds (63%) of partnership project cus-
tomers are women and at least 58% were minorities, with Hispanic individuals com-
prising 39% of the total served. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., CTR. FOR FAMILIES, CHID. & THE
CTS., EQUAL ACCESS FUND: A REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 54 (2005), http://
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Equal-Access-Fund-March-2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/MSD5
-Q4PH]. A survey of unrepresented family court litigants in New York City found slightly
less than half of respondents were women (45%), but 84% were minorities (48% African
American and 31% Hispanic), 39% had only a high school-level education, and 53% earned
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men to be victims of domestic violence,16 not all women have the same
exposure to violence. Black women experience intimate partner vio-
lence at a rate thirty-five percent higher than that of white females,
and about two and one half times the rate of women of other races.17
Higher rates of domestic abuse are also found among more recent and
undocumented immigrants.18 Unauthorized immigrants are espe-
cially at risk for victimization; cultural pressures relating to the im-
migration experience also render women in some communities more
at risk for abuse than others.19 Poverty is also associated with higher
rates of violence in economically marginalized communities served
by self-help centers.20 Poor women are much more likely to experience
less than $20,000 per year. NEW YORK CITY RESULTS OF TWO SURVEYS, supra note 5, at 4.
See GREACEN, supra note 5 (reporting studies of self-help service populations, many (but
not all) of which fit this profile); infra Part II (reporting data from the self-help programs
in the current study, which shows most protection order applicants using the programs
were low income women of color with little educational attainment, and many spoke a lan-
guage other than English as their first language).
16. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2003) (estimating 5.3 million
intimate partner assaults against women in the United States each year); PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iv (2000), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/nij/183781.pdf [http://perma.cc/KMJ3-NC8U] (reporting that approximately 1.3 million
women are physically assaulted by an intimate partner annually in the United States, as
compared to 835,000 men). Domestic violence made up 20% of all nonfatal violent crime
experienced by women in 2001, and just 3% of the nonfatal violence against men. Further,
in 2000, 1,247 women were killed by an intimate partner, as compared to 440 men. CALLIE
MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIME DATA BRIEF:
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, 1993–2001 1 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf
/ipv01.pdf [http://perma.cc/3A7S-QLP2] (also reporting that an intimate partner killed
approximately 33% of female murder victims, but only 4% of male murder victims).
17. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 4 (2002), http://www
.popcenter.org/problems/domestic_violence/PDFs/Rennison%26Welchans_2000.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TD7F-SE7D].
18. Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and
Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 250 (2000) (reporting that 48% of Latinas responding to a survey
experienced increased violence from their partners after immigrating to the United
States); see N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, FEMICIDE IN NEW YORK CITY:
1995–2002 5 (2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/ip/femicide1995-2002
_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8NE-LTX5] (reporting that 51% of intimate partner homi-
cide victims in New York City were foreign-born).
19. See, e.g., Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Reading Between the Lines Is Not Enough:
Lessons from Media Coverage of a Domestic Violence Homicide-Suicide, 17 AM. U. J. GEN-
DER SOC. POL’Y & L. 269, 286–88 (2009) [hereinafter MacDowell, When Reading Between
the Lines Is Not Enough] (describing the complex role of culture and Indian nationalism
in high rates of domestic violence experienced by South Asian immigrant women in the
United States).
20. Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race,
Class, and Gender: Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Mar-
ginalized Women in Diverse Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38, 48 (2005);
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victimization by intimate partners than women who are better off
financially, because of the stress economic insecurity causes on
families, and because it makes it more difficult to escape a violent
relationship.21 Additionally, the interplay of race and gender and ac-
cess to justice may explain higher rates of domestic violence experi-
enced by some women.22 It is critical to understand whether self-help
centers are meeting the needs of those most at risk for violence.
Third, low-income survivors of color who make it to court are
especially vulnerable to the potentially negative impacts of engaging
the justice system, which includes facing family court judges and oth-
ers who are hostile to their claims, exposure to unwanted state inter-
ventions, and problems of over—and under—enforcement of orders.23
These vulnerabilities are due in part to the operation of powerful
tropes about both victims and perpetrators of domestic violence that
infuse the system and subject women and men of color, poor people,
sexual minorities, and gender nonconforming individuals to disad-
vantage.24 While feminist-informed advocacy has played a central
role in helping survivors (particularly women) navigate the perils of
the legal system, self-help is modeled on an ethic of neutrality, rather
than partiality for survivors’ needs.25 Yet, the effect on low-income
survivors of color of partnerships between nongovernmental advocacy
organizations and the courts to provide self-help services is largely
unexplored. This Article begins that exploration through the lens of
demeanor, which has been used by scholars to analyze interactions
see ANANNYA BHATTACHARJEE, WHOSE SAFETY? WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE VIOLENCE OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT 18 (2001), https://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents
/whose%20safety.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z9KB-YFGW] (unpublished Justice Visions work-
ing paper) (citing CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE
AGE OF CRISIS 239 (1999)) (explaining that African Americans and Hispanics represent
22.8% of the population, but make up 47.8% of those living in poverty).
21. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 11, at 26; see MICHAEL L. BENSON & GREER LITTON
FOX, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., NCJ 205004, WHEN VIOLENCE HITS HOME: HOW ECONOMICS
AND NEIGHBORHOOD PLAY A ROLE 2–3 (2004) (reporting data showing that women are
at greater risk of domestic violence when their partners are unemployed or experiencing
financial strain).
22. See CAROLINE BETTINGER-LOPEZ ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PRELIMINARY REPORT PREPARED FOR RASHIDA MANJOO, U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 7 (2011), http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicac
tions.net/files/newsletter/DV%20in%20the%20US_Br%20Paper%20to%20SR%20on%20
VAW.pdf [http://perma.cc/WC4T-NQUJ] (“American Indian and Alaska Native women face
unique access to justice because determining which government (federal, state, or tribal)
is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of violent crimes on Indian lands de-
pends on the race of the perpetrator and the race of the victim.”).
23. See infra Part I (describing structural and systemic barriers faced by applicants
for protection orders trying to access the courts and utilize protection order remedies).
24. See infra Part I (describing stereotypes of the “perfect victim” and the “perceiv-
able perpetrator”).
25. See infra Part I (describing differences between traditional lay victim advocacy
and self-help).
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between litigants and judges and other court personnel within court
systems and processes.26
B. Demeanor
Demeanor is shorthand for a complex set of social behaviors that
relate to what sociologist Erving Goffman describes as ceremonial
rules of conduct.27 Despite the implications of the term “ceremonial,”
these rules are not extraordinary; rather, they are ingrained in
everyday behavior such that individuals usually perform them un-
consciously and become aware of them only when expectations of
another’s performance are not met.28 Ceremonial rules of conduct
are distinguished from substantive conduct, or conduct that has mean-
ing independent of its implications for the character of the person
performing the action or the recipient.29 For example, if a judge grants
an order, it has meaning independent of whether the order is granted
begrudgingly or in a manner that reinforces its validity and import.30
Granting the order involves substantive conduct; the manner in
which it is granted is ceremonial.31 Put another way, ceremonial con-
duct is the “how” of an act, as opposed to the “what.” 32 It is expressed
through multiple dimensions: linguistic (e.g., the language chosen
for an exchange), spatial (e.g., physical distance and regard of per-
sonal space), and is embedded in the performance of tasks.33
The rules of ceremonial conduct vary depending on an individual’s
social role or position within a given social setting and may be sym-
metrical (e.g., the recipient of the conduct is similarly obligated to
the actor) or asymmetrical in nature, depending on expectations of
reciprocity.34 Such rules are complex, interactive, and communicative;
they help to constitute both the individual and the group.35 Within
26. See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES 133–34 (1999) (reporting findings of a study of judicial demeanor toward pro-
tection order applicants and defendants); see also Maureen Mileski, Courtroom Encounters:
An Observation Study of a Lower Criminal Court, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 473, 521–31 (1971)
(discussing the ways in which judges use demeanor to “situationally sanction[ ]” defendants
found guilty of lesser crimes).
27. See Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 58 AM. ANTHROPOL-
OGIST 473, 476 (1956).
28. Id. at 474 (“[M]ost actions which are guided by rules of conduct are performed
unthinkingly . . . .”).
29. Id. at 476.
30. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 94 (relating this concept to judicial actions in protection
order hearings).
31. Id. at 93–94.
32. Id. at 94–95.
33. Goffman, supra note 27, at 477.
34. Id. at 476.
35. See id. at 475 (describing how rules of conduct relate to individuals in social action).
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this more complex understanding, the term demeanor references how
an individual handles herself within a given set of expectations,36 for
example, whether an individual takes on a task willingly or in a man-
ner indicating resentment. The complement to demeanor is defer-
ence, which references the social nature of the interaction, and the
individual’s place within social hierarchy.37 Deference is visible “in
the little salutations, compliments, and apologies which punctuate
social intercourse, and may be referred to as ‘status rituals’ or ‘inter-
personal rituals.’ ” 38 Deference includes rules about what should be
avoided (e.g., invading another’s personal space and privacy) and
rules about what should be done (e.g., salutations, invitations, and
compliments).39 Demeanor and deference are complementary and
overlapping; together they relate to the social construction of individ-
uals as “a product of joint ceremonial labor.” 40
The essential point of this Article is that the study of demeanor,
broadly understood as encompassing deference and other interrelated
codes of conduct, is most meaningful when conducted with reference
to its social context and function. In the case of self-help services for
domestic violence protection order applicants, that includes consid-
ering its relationship to the goals of remedies resulting from a social
movement informed by feminist principles,41 and the needs of the
largely low-income women of color seeking access to these remedies
in family courts.42 It also requires examining the ways in which self-
help works to either challenge or reinforce relationships of power and
privilege in the context of domestic violence.43 By critically assessing
these issues, this Article expands on prior accounts of demeanor in
legal settings and contributes to new ways of understanding and eval-
uating self-help interventions for domestic violence and for studying
self-help more generally. This Article details the ways in which staff
members’ demeanor shapes the protection order process. A second
article will examine how the organization of work within self-help
centers constrains demeanor and structure the delivery of services.
Part I provides background on protection order remedies, includ-
ing their roots in advocacy by feminist activists and poverty lawyers
36. Id. at 492.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 478.
39. Goffman, supra note 27, at 481–86.
40. Id. at 493.
41. See infra Part I (discussing the origins of protection order legislation).
42. See infra Part II (discussing the contextualized and advocacy-based standpoint
of institutional ethnography).
43. See infra Part III (analyzing the ways in which self-help staff members regulate
protection order applicants).
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advocating for battered women. It also discusses the goals of protec-
tion order legislation and provides an overview of the types of relief
available. Additionally, this Part describes the challenges faced by
protection order applicants in the court system, including pervasive
stereotypes about victims and perpetrators that affect access to rem-
edies and services. This Part also discusses the traditional role of lay
advocates in helping women access protection orders and contrasts
the traditional (if idealized) lay advocacy role with the purported neu-
trality of self-help assistance.
Part II discusses approaches to research about self-help services
and describes the present study. This Part explains key features of the
research sites, and it provides an overview of services provided at the
two programs that were studied. This Part also discusses the research
methods used in the study and describes how data was analyzed.
Part III details findings about interactions between self-help
center staff and protection order applicants. To begin, this Part es-
tablishes self-help staff as engaged in emotional labor, of which the
presentation of demeanor is a central part. Part III then presents
staff-applicant interactions within a new seven-point typology of de-
meanor that expands on prior studies of demeanor in protection order
hearings and advocacy settings.
Part IV challenges the concept of neutrality in self-help services.
This Part describes the regulatory function of demeanor in self-help
centers, where staff members use demeanor to reward or punish liti-
gants based on their performance within narrowly construed roles
and expectations, and to control an emotionally volatile environment
for which staff members are often ill-prepared. This Part also shows
how self-help staff members limit the types of relief sought by appli-
cants and the narratives presented to the court about domestic vio-
lence. The Article concludes with a summary of the implications of
these findings for future access to justice initiatives and research
that takes the political nature of self-help services into account.
I. PROTECTION ORDERS AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
A. Protection Order Remedies
1. Historical Background
Protection order remedies are the product of an advocacy move-
ment for battered women by activists and poverty lawyers who sought
ways to address domestic violence outside both the criminal justice
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system and civil divorce proceedings.44 While the battered women’s
movement is often criticized for failing to take the needs of women
of color sufficiently into account, the pursuit of protection order leg-
islation centered their concerns.45 Civil protection orders were seen
as a way for women of color to obtain relief from abuse without sub-
jecting abusive partners to racist law enforcement practices and the
criminal justice system.46 Unlike criminal orders, civil protection or-
ders could be enforced through contempt proceedings in family court
and do not require engagement with the criminal system.47 Civil pro-
tection orders could also improve upon then-existing civil remedies,48
and they provide a host of remedies normally available only after
divorce proceedings, including orders for custody of children, posses-
sion of property, and child and spousal support.49
44. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 162–65 (1982) (describing early civil legal reforms
for battered women); Margaret Klaw & Mary Scherf, Feminist Advocacy: The Evolution
of Pennsylvania’s Protection from Abuse Act, 1 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 21, 21 (1993)
(describing “collaboration among grassroots women’s advocates, legal services attorneys
and sensitive legislators”); see also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, VAWA @ 20: Improving Civil
Legal Assistance for Ending Gender Violence, CUNY L. REV. (Nov. 21, 2014) [hereinafter
MacDowell, Improving Civil Legal Assistance], http://www.cunylawreview.org/vawa-20
-improving-civil-legal-assistance-for-ending-gender-violence-by-elizabeth-macdowell
[http://perma.cc/XSW5-Z9L5] (describing the background of protection order legislation).
Pennsylvania is generally credited with passing the first domestic violence protection
order legislation, as part of the Protection from Abuse Act, now codified at 23 PA. STAT AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6101–6122 (West 2015).
45. Interview with Barbara Hart, Director of Strategic Justice Initiatives and Director
of Law and Policy, Violence Against Women Initiatives, Muskie School of Public Service,
Cutler Institute for Health and Social Policy, University of Southern Maine (Nov. 21, 2013)
[hereinafter Hart Interview] (notes on file with author) (describing motives for protection
order initiatives brought by legal aid attorneys and activists).
46. Id.; see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (assert-
ing a general unwillingness of people of color to subject their private lives to intrusion
by a frequently hostile state); Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law,
Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (2000)
(observing that the risk of an undocumented partner being deported, as well as a fear of
being deported herself if she is undocumented, may lead a survivor to fear calling the po-
lice for help); MacDowell, When Reading Between the Lines Is Not Enough, supra note 19,
at 286–88 (discussing why revealing domestic abuse may be perceived as a betrayal of
culture by South Asian survivors and their communities).
47. SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 163–64.
48. These included “peace bond[s], which could be issued . . . in any situation involving
a disturbance of the peace . . . [but] were essentially unenforceable.” Klaw & Scherf, supra
note 44, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Judges could also issue injunctive
relief in divorce cases aimed at preventing abuse. See SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 162
(“As of 1981, twelve states still granted such injunctions pending only divorce, separation,
or custody proceedings.”).
49. See SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 162 (noting that many women only want the
abuse to stop, not to separate from their husbands). Protection orders were also designed
to extend relief to unmarried women. See SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 163 (noting
unmarried women were relegated to criminal remedies); Hart Interview, supra note 45.
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Activists wanted battered women to have more access, agency
and control over remedies for domestic violence than those available
through criminal responses.50 They also hoped that more readily
available orders for the custody and protection of children would help
prevent child protective services agencies from removing children
from battered women’s custody, a problem more commonly experi-
enced by low-income women of color and which continues today, as
discussed below.51
2. Current Status
Today, civil protection orders for domestic violence are available
in every state and the District of Columbia.52 Qualifying relationships
commonly include an array of intimate or personal relationships,
such as current or former marital or dating partners, family mem-
bers, people with children in common, and individuals who live to-
gether, including roommates.53 Qualifying acts of domestic violence
may include abuse that is not recognized as a crime, such as some
forms of emotional and economic abuse, as well behavior that is also
criminalized.54 In addition to orders for custody of children, possession
of property, and child and spousal support, available remedies com-
monly include orders that the adverse party stay away from and not
50. SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 162; Klaw & Scherf, supra note 44, at 33 (“Filing
a civil suit differs fundamentally from pursuing criminal prosecution in that the woman
herself is the plaintiff and is in control of how the case is litigated or settled.”); Elizabeth
L. MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts and Court Plu-
ralism, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 107–10 (2011) [hereinafter MacDowell, When Courts
Collide] (comparing and contrasting civil and criminal remedies for domestic violence);
Hart Interview, supra note 45.
51. Hart Interview, supra note 45. Child protection agencies commonly removed
children of abused women under the theory that they failed to protect the children from
exposure to the abuse perpetrated against them. See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing
Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 557–59 (2006) (describing such policies in New
York state). Such removals are disproportionately made in cases involving low-income
women of color. Id. For further discussion on the effects of race on child removals, see
DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002).
52. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993).
For a comprehensive list of remedies available under civil protective orders in various
states, see id. at 910–1006.
53. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 52, at 814–42 (describing qualifying relationships
in various jurisdictions).
54. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Crim-
inal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1406 (1991) (observing that civil protection orders can prohibit
noncriminal conduct even though such orders may be enforceable with criminal penalties).
But see Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1138 (2009) (explaining that only one-
third of states provide a civil remedy for abuse absent a threat of physical violence).
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engage in further acts of violence against the protected party and
other specified persons; requiring the adverse party to surrender fire-
arms; and excluding him or her from a shared residence.55 At least ten
states and the District of Columbia also allow orders concerning pets
to be included on protective orders.56 Additionally, courts can order
the adverse party to attend a batterer treatment program, reimburse
the protected party for costs associated with the abuse, and pay the
protected party’s attorney fees.57 These remedies are generally avail-
able through an expedited process, and temporary orders may be
issued without notice to the adverse party.58
Despite the expansion of relief available, however, the goals of
anti-domestic violence advocates have not been fully realized. Survi-
vors of abuse may be excluded from civil protection order remedies
because they cannot meet relationship criteria for such relief, espe-
cially if the abuse occurred within a same-sex relationship.59 Survi-
vors may also be excluded from civil remedies if the abuse is not yet
physical or does not amount to a criminal act.60 Some states also fail
to provide important economic relief such as child support through
55. Klein & Orloff, supra note 52, at 910–42. In some states civil protective orders may
remain in effect longer than criminal orders, as well. For example, civil protective orders
issued under California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act can be renewed permanently
upon request after an initial term of up to five years. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West
2009 & Supp. 2011); see Klein & Orloff, supra note 52, at 1085–88 (describing the duration
of various states’ civil protective orders, from a period of one year to an indefinite duration).
56. States permitting protection of pets include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, Tennessee, and Vermont. PHIL ARKOW & TRACY COPPOLA,
EXPANDING PROTECTIVE ORDERS TO INCLUDE COMPANION ANIMALS 2, http://www.american
humane.org/assets/pdfs/interaction/hab-link-ppo-companion-animals.pdf [http://perma
.cc/6HLB-AGGT]. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between domestic vio-
lence and animal abuse, see Frank R. Ascione et al., Battered Pets and Domestic Violence:
Animal Abuse Reported by Women Experiencing Intimate Violence and by Nonabused
Women, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 354 (2007).
57. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 52, at 1031–42.
58. Id. at 1031–42; see, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 240–246 (West 2004).
59. Several states do not allow or guarantee access to protection orders for couples
in same-sex relationships. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS (CPOS) BY STATE OVERVIEW OF CPO PROTECTIONS
FOR LGBT VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2008), http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/pdfs/CPO_Protections_for_LGBT_Victims_7_08.authcheck
dam.pdf [http://perma.cc/T6WP-JXUR]; see also Sarah E. Warne, Note, Rocks, Hard Places,
and Unconventional Domestic Violence Victims: Expanding Availability of Civil Orders
of Protection in New York, 52 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 279, 291–300 (2007–2008) (describing
problems associated with excluding LGBT survivors from protection order remedies).
60. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1138 (2009); see Deborah M.
Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between “The Truly National
and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1124–25 (2001) (describing that even when
statutes allow relief for claims based on threats of violence, judges may apply procedural
rules in ways that deny relief to women who have not experienced recent physical violence).
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the protection order process.61 Survivors seeking help for domestic
violence in civil courts also face numerous structural obstacles to ob-
taining relief, including gender and racial bias on the part of judges
and other court personnel, and exposure to punitive state systems.62
The next section details these problems, and discusses why protection
orders nonetheless remain an important resource.
B. Structural and Systemic Problems Facing Applicants
1. Stereotypes About Victims and Perpetrators
The problem of bias in family courts, especially against women
claiming domestic violence, is well established.63 Studies indicate that
some family court judges do not understand the dynamics of domestic
violence and blame women for being victimized,64 are generally un-
sympathetic to their claims,65 and prioritize men’s privacy rights
over women’s safety.66 Poor outcomes for domestic violence survivors
have been attributed to what I have referred to elsewhere as the
“delegalized” culture of family courts, which favors informal processes
and privileges the non-legal perspectives of social workers and child
custody evaluators.67 Scholars also point to the vagueness of custody
61. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL
PROTECTION ORDERS (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dom
viol/docs/DV_CPO_Chart_8_2008.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/N75C-56H8] (sum-
marizing state laws).
62. SCHECHTER, supra note 44, at 162–65; Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the
Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 1, 55–58 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Swent, supra note 62, at 55–58 (summarizing results from gender bias
task force studies conducted across the United States); see also SCHECHTER, supra note 44,
at 162–63 (discussing bias experienced by battered women in family courts); Elizabeth
L. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and Intersectional Theory on
Domestic Violence, 16 J. OF GENDER, RACE & JUST. 531, 539 nn.28 & 29 (2013) [hereinafter
MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity] (discussing outcomes in custody and visitation
cases involving domestic violence claims).
64. See Laura L. Crites, Wife Abuse: The Judicial Record, in 11 WOMEN, THE COURTS,
AND EQUALITY 42 (Laura L. Crites & Winifred L. Hepperle, eds., 1987).
65. DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 241
(1989); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to Real-
ize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 360–63 (2011) [hereinafter
Stoever, Freedom from Violence] (describing the routine victim-blaming perpetrated by
family court judges).
66. See Crites, supra note 64, at 41–42. But see PTACEK, supra note 26, at 150 (reporting
results of a study in which 67% of the judges were described as supportive by women
appearing in front of them). See also M. Chaudhuri & K. Daly, Do Restraining Orders
Help? Battered Women’s Experiences with Male Violence and the Legal Process, in DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 246 (E.S. Buzawa & C.G.
Buzawa, eds., 1992) (finding women were pleased with the protection order process).
67. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts,
22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 478 (2015) [hereinafter MacDowell, Reimagining
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standards,68 and judges’ reluctance to restrict batterers’ access to
children as creating barriers to relief.69 Battered women’s emotional
responses to abuse may also hurt their credibility with judges,
however unfairly.70 The theory of intersectionality helps to explain
how race and gender stereotypes interact, such that some individu-
als in this hostile landscape are more readily recognized as victims
than others.71
In particular, the ideal of the perfect victim—a woman who is
white, middle class, heterosexual, and passive—infuses domestic vio-
lence law and policy.72 Survivors who diverge from that norm are less
likely to be recognized as deserving protection. Women of color may
also have to overcome stereotypes that negate their victimization and
suggest they are unworthy of protection.73
Additionally, the identity of the perpetrator influences who is
recognized as a victim.74 Like the perfect victim trope, the “perceivable
perpetrator” identity is hinged on often-unconscious assumptions
that relate to race, sexuality and class.75 These tropes tend to cast men
of color as perpetrators and to favor white men.76 Thus, an individual
seeking protection from the court must not only comport with the cri-
teria for the perfect victim, but also supply a perceivable perpetrator.
Moreover, even survivors who succeed in obtaining a protection order
may experience other, unwanted interventions into their families
Access to Justice] (laying out the defining characteristics of delegalization in family courts);
see MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 50, at 121 (discussing how survivors’
access to civil court remedies for domestic violence is constrained by court culture); see
also Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 731–33 (1988) (describing medi-
ators and social workers as supplanting legal actors in the family courts).
68. See Fineman, supra note 67, at 770 (arguing the best interest of the child standard
for determining parental custody must be replaced with a standard that is more deter-
minate and less susceptible to moral rather than legal judgments).
69. See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Under-
standing Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 657, 676–77 (2003) (describing the belief of judges in domestic violence cases
that it is unfair to consider the perpetrator’s violence against the other parent when ad-
dressing child custody issues).
70. Id. at 691–92 (explaining how battered women’s anger at the abuse and the effects
of PTSD may negatively impact their case).
71. See Crenshaw, supra note 46, at 1245–51; see also MacDowell, Theorizing from
Particularity, supra note 63, at 546–58 (applying intersectionality to perpetrators).
72. See Adele M. Morrison, Changing the Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving From
White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1061, 1078–80 (2006).
73. MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity, supra note 63, at 533 (discussing
stereotypes).
74. Id. at 546–49.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 547.
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due to encounters with punitive state systems as they seek a protec-
tion order.77
2. Intersecting State Systems
Applicants for protection orders increasingly face intersecting
civil, criminal and child welfare systems that challenge their ability
to determine what sorts of state intervention will occur. Unwanted
state interventions are more likely when systems that serve different
functions (e.g., punitive and supportive) are combined.78 However,
the blurring of system boundaries through this combining of differ-
ent functions increasingly occurs under the guise of benefiting abuse
survivors by concentrating services, for example in integrated do-
mestic violence courts,79 and in so-called “family justice centers.” 80 In
these instances, the interests of the state may eclipse those of sur-
vivors, leaving the goals of reformers unrealized.
Integrated courts combining civil and criminal domestic violence
cases may actually reduce the level of choice that would otherwise be
available to survivors about what services they need and whether to
make a criminal complaint.81 Law professor Deborah Epstein warns,
“a woman who enters a comprehensive Intake Center seeking only
a civil protection order is likely to also be automatically routed to a
prosecution advocate to initiate criminal charges without being asked
whether she wishes to do so.” 82 Thus, Epstein observes, survivors’
ability to decline services they do not want may be reduced.83
77. MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 50, at 105–06, 115.
78. See id. at 106–07 (discussing problems for survivors when criminal and civil
remedies are combined within specialized, integrated domestic violence courts); Leah
Hill, Do You See What I See? Reflections on How Bias Infiltrates the New York City Fam-
ily Court—The Case of the Court Ordered Investigation, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
527, 540–43 (2007) (discussing problems that arise for poor parents in family courts uti-
lizing child welfare workers, trained to investigate parental abuse or neglect, to investi-
gate private custody claims).
79. See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 50, at 115–17 (describing justi-
fications for domestic violence services that offer “one-stop shopping”).
80. See FAMILY JUSTICE CENTER ALLIANCE, History: History of the Family Justice Center
Movement, http://www.familyjusticecenter.org/index.php/history.html [http://perma.cc
/3D52-PCFE] (describing the development of the Family Justice Center model, which com-
bines civil legal assistance and other services for survivors in one location with specialized
law enforcement and prosecutorial teams).
81. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking
the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3,
38 (1999).
82. Id.
83. Id.; see Rebecca Fialk & Tamara Mitchel, Jurisprudence: Due Process Concerns
for the Underrepresented Domestic Violence Victim, 13 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 180–83
(2004) (identifying potential conflicts between survivors and advocates in domestic vio-
lence court).
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Survivors using integrated courts and other mixed-system service
centers, like family justice centers, may also be exposed to heightened
risk of being reported to child protective services should they decide
not to pursue criminal charges or a civil protection order.84 Exposure
to intersecting systems increases the chance that victims will be ac-
cused of failing to protect their children from the perpetrator’s abuse.85
The threat of intervention by child protection agencies and exposure
to failure-to-protect charges curtails survivors’ choices, including by
limiting their ability to choose whether to go forward with a civil pro-
tection order after the temporary order expires, and encouraging
them to accept unwanted services suggested by social workers.86 Fear
of intervention by child protection agencies may also discourage sur-
vivors from utilizing the court and accessing legal remedies. Inte-
grated systems therefore present a barrier to protection orders for
some survivors.
The ability of survivors to bypass the criminal justice system
may also be overstated. Although protection orders ostensibly provide
an alternative to the criminal justice system, violation of these or-
ders is a crime in every state.87 While a protected party can theoreti-
cally enforce the order by filing for contempt in civil court if the order
is violated, bringing a contempt motion may be prohibitively complex
for those without an attorney.88 Also, as detailed above, family court
judges are often hostile to domestic violence claimants, undermining
the goal of rigorous enforcement through the contempt process. Thus,
as a practical matter, survivors may still be reliant on the criminal
justice system to enforce a civil protection order. Law enforcement
policies may lead to either under or over enforcement, depending on
the jurisdiction.89
84. See Jane Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice Centers, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
16–23 (forthcoming 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
85. See Epstein, supra note 81, at 34–35 (acknowledging increased risk of survivors
being reported to child protection agencies when using an integrated domestic violence
court); Fialk & Mitchel, supra note 83, at 183 (describing risks to survivors from expo-
sure to mandated child abuse reporters in domestic violence court); see also MacDowell,
When Courts Collide, supra note 50, at 118 (“The heightened risk of failure-to-protect
charges faced by [survivors] in integrated courts has been attributed to their exposure
to government attorneys and others with differing professional and institutional inter-
ests within the integrated court environment.”).
86. See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 50, at 117.
87. Klein & Orloff, supra note 52, at 810.
88. See Adele Harrell & Barbara E. Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic
Violence Victims, in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 240 (Eve S. Buzawa &
Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996) (reporting the finding that many women do not understand
the protection order process or the options available to them). Civil contempt is confusing
and not well understood by many attorneys and judges, much less lay people. See id.
at 240–41.
89. Despite more aggressive police practices, including the adoption of mandatory ar-
rest and prosecution laws in many states, there are ongoing problems of underenforcement
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More generally, the efficacy of protection orders in stopping vio-
lence is debatable.90 Nonetheless, some studies of women who have
obtained protection orders indicate that they view them as effective,
in part because of the threat of criminal sanctions entailed by the
order, and in part because of the agency they exercised in obtaining
the order and resisting abuse.91 Moreover, perhaps in part due to the
lack of other options, protection orders continue to play an important
role in survivors’ safety strategies, especially for low-income women.92
In this context, lay advocates have played an important role in help-
ing survivors to access the court system.
C. Lay Advocacy and Self-Help
While self-help and other alternatives to traditional legal repre-
sentation have received greater attention in recent years, non-
attorney advocates have traditionally played an important role in
access to justice for protection order applicants.93 Most applicants are
unrepresented by counsel.94 Lay victim advocates have filled this void
by performing both “care work” and “legal work” for survivors.95 Care
work includes “listening patiently to clients, giving them control over
of domestic violence laws. See Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle
for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1697–98 (reporting
low proportions of domestic violence arrests and high proportions of arrests that are not
prosecuted, even in cities with mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies). Con-
versely, in some jurisdictions, violations of protective orders are prosecuted despite the
objection of protected parties (e.g., when they have reconciled with the party subject to the
order), and in some states have become a shortcut to convictions for other crimes, such as
burglary. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVO-
LUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 25–27 (2009).
90. See Robert C. Davis & Barbara Smith, Domestic Violence Reforms: Empty Promises
or Fulfilled Expectations?, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 541, 541–53 (1995) (reviewing stud-
ies about the efficacy of major reforms aimed at countering domestic violence, including
protection orders); Caroline N. Ko, Note, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence:
The Unresolved Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 371–76 (2002)
(reviewing studies examining the effectiveness of temporary protection orders).
91. See PTACEK, supra note 26, at 167.
92. See Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 1541.
93. See Arlene N. Weisz, Legal Advocacy for Domestic Violence Survivors: The Power
of an Informative Relationship, 80 FAMS. IN SOC’Y 138, 139–40 (1999); see also Megan
Allen et al., Voices from the Field: Civil Legal Advocacy at Stand-Alone Sexual Assault
Programs, CONNECTIONS, Fall 2012, at 17 (discussing the benefits of civil legal advocacy).
94. See Stoever, Freedom from Violence, supra note 65, at 347 (discussing the need
for advocates where “[a]lmost all [domestic violence protection orders] petitioners enter
the system pro se, and only a fortunate few are able to obtain counsel after filing their
cases”).
95. See Kenneth H. Kolb, Victim Advocates’ Perceptions of Legal Work, 17 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1559, 1562 (2011).
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the conversation, and empathizing with them when appropriate.” 96
Legal work consists of “informing clients about how to exercise their
legal options,” accompanying applicants to their court hearings, and
providing information and support to them in civil proceedings.97 In
addition, lay advocates can help to increase survivors’ safety by as-
sisting them with safety planning.98 This assistance is imperative
because survivors face heightened danger when separating from
abusers and exercising legal options such as filing for a protective
order.99 Empowerment is also a core component of traditional femi-
nist lay victim advocacy, conceptualized as helping survivors gain a
sense of personal agency and taking an active stance in fighting the
conditions of their oppression.100
96. Id.
97. See id. (explaining that, in practice, victim advocates shift back and forth between
care and legal work); see also Weisz, supra note 93, at 141 (reporting that most interac-
tions between advocates and survivors involve advocates providing “information within
the context of an emotionally supportive relationship”).
98. See JILL DAVIES & ELEANOR LYON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCACY: COMPLEX
LIVES/DIFFICULT CHOICES 3–4 (2d ed. 2014) (describing advocacy as a partnership with
the survivor in which safety planning is a central part).
99. See Stoever, Freedom from Violence, supra note 65, at 335 (“Leaving or attempting
to break free from an abuser’s control, such as through seeking a protection order, is the
most dangerous point in time for someone who has experienced domestic violence. It is now
well understood that there is a high likelihood of ‘separation assault,’ that leaving is a
major risk factor for homicide, and that women have a well-grounded fear of increased
violence to themselves and their children if they attempt to leave. Moreover, fear may
cause a woman to leave but also to return to an abusive partner.”) (internal footnotes
omitted); see also Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 1537–38 (observing that an abuser may
perceive legal action as a loss of power and escalate the violence in response).
100. See, e.g., M. Joan McDermott & James Garofalo, When Advocacy for Domestic
Violence Victims Backfires: Types and Sources of Victim Disempowerment, 10 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 1245, 1248 (2004). Client-centered lay advocates operate to empower
clients to reach their self-determined goals. See Joanne Belknap & Hillary Potter, The
Trials of Measuring the “Success” of Domestic Violence Policies, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 559, 561 (2005); Andrea J. Nichols, Meaning-Making and Domestic Violence Victim
Advocacy: An Examination of Feminist Identities, Ideologies, and Practices, 8 FEMINIST
CRIMINOLOGY 177, 187–89 (2013); Stoever, Freedom From Violence, supra note 65, at 349;
see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-61A-0145 (2009) (“Advocacy-based counseling means
the involvement of a client with an advocate counselor in an individual, family, or group
session with the primary focus on safety planning and on empowerment of the client
through reinforcing the client’s autonomy and self-determination.”) (repealed 2010).
Although client-centered, empowerment-focused advocacy is associated with feminism,
not all lay advocates in the early battered women’s movement identified as feminists.
See Ellen Pence, Advocacy on Behalf of Battered Women, in SOURCEBOOK ON VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 329, 332 (Claire M. Renzetti et al., eds, 2001) (noting that advocates
shared a common commitment to battered women but not necessarily a shared ideology).
However, a recent study suggests that advocates who do not identify as feminists are less
likely to see the need for structural change to address gender violence and lack an under-
standing of how identity relates to their client’s victimization. See Nichols, supra note 100,
at 192.
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Lay advocates’ ability to provide valuable legal information
together with emotional support is viewed as essential to their success
in working with survivors, and as contributing to survivors’ increased
participation in the legal system.101 Lay victim advocates also tradi-
tionally engage in social change practices, as well as individualized
advocacy, seeking “to expand support services to abused women and
to bring the problem of domestic violence to public and political
attention.”102 This includes intersectional advocacy practices aimed
at improving outreach, and the accessibility and quality of services.103
Lay advocates’ partiality to survivors’ needs and concerns, and the ex-
pertise that informs it, makes them uniquely positioned to represent
the interests of survivors within legal and other state systems.104
Thus, conditions that undermine this partiality should be of concern.
Scholars and activists note an erosion of advocates’ understanding
of, and commitment to, survivors’ needs and interests following the
professionalization and bureaucratization of advocacy services.105
These shifts tend to distance advocates from the perspectives of sur-
vivors, and from a critical analysis of gender violence and the change-
oriented aspects of advocacy work.106 Additionally, as advocates have
increasingly come under the auspices of state institutions like law
enforcement, prosecutors’ offices, and the courts, their work is driven
101. For example, a study of civil sexual assault protection order hearings found that
when lay advocates provided survivors seeking protection orders with legal advocacy
in court,
[t]here was an 80% success rate in getting the order granted, compared with
a 34% success rate for petitioners without an advocate. [The difference in
outcomes was attributed] . . . to advocates keeping petitioners engaged in
the process, conveying what to expect at court, and determining whether a
[protection order] is the appropriate remedy.
Laura Jones, Court Monitoring as Advocacy, CONNECTIONS, Fall 2012, at 8.
102. Nichols, supra note 100, at 181 (internal citation omitted); see Pence, supra
note 100, at 329 (distinguishing individual case advocacy from systems or institutional
advocacy).
103. Pence, supra note 100, at 340–41.
104. See Elizabeth Ben-Ishai, The Autonomy-Fostering State: “Coordinated Fragmen-
tation” and Domestic Violence Services, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 307, 323 (2009) (arguing that coor-
dinated community responses to domestic violence “support the perpetual questioning of
‘impartial’ decisions and procedures undertaken by the criminal justice and legal system”
by embedding advocates for battered women within impartiality-oriented institutions).
105. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 100, at 182 (describing how professionalization and
bureaucratization of lay advocacy services has led to the diminution of feminist advocacy
strategies); KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRI-
ATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE 70 (2008) (“Currently, as part
of the process of making battered women’s shelters more professional, a mandate exists
for changing the primary methods by which shelters work—requiring them to move away
from encouraging women’s transformation through consciousness raising to a more service-
oriented model that involves administrating clients’ needs.”).
106. See Pence, supra note 100, at 341–42 (discussing the impacts on advocates of co-
ordinated community response models that marginalized their expertise).
2016] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-HELP 223
by institutional and system goals and objectives rather than the
needs and interests of survivors.107
Self-help differs from the feminist lay advocacy model from the
outset in several respects. Unlike the feminist-based practice of lay
victim advocacy, self-help programs are not based on a theory of fem-
inist (or other) advocacy; rather, self-help is conceptualized as an
alternative to legal representation by an attorney.108 Self-help also
lacks the independence associated with effective lay advocacy, in that
it often takes place in partnership with courts, and typically serves
the dual goals of aiding the court as well as assisting unrepresented
litigants. As discussed further below, self-help programs may adopt
the term “advocate” while distancing themselves from the advocacy
function. Moreover, we know almost nothing about what self-help
models mean for protection order applicants or other unrepre-
sented litigants.109
II. STUDYING SELF-HELP
A. Research on Self-Help Services
There are only three published studies examining self-help or
similar, unbundled legal services provided in the United States.110 Of
these, only two compare outcomes in cases receiving self-help type as-
sistance with cases receiving no, or different, assistance; neither study
107. See id. at 342; Ben-Ishai, supra note 104, at 323 (noting the need for advocates to
maintain independence from state systems in order to retain partiality to survivor needs).
108. This is reflected in controversies about the unauthorized practice of law that
dominate discussions of self-help and unbundled legal services. See Steinberg, supra note
3, at 467.
109. Id. at 497.
110. See id. at 480–82 (reporting a comparison of outcomes for unlawful detainer
defendants receiving either unbundled legal services from Legal Aid attorneys, full rep-
resentation from Stanford clinical law students, or no assistance); VAN NUYS FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 12, at 10 (evaluating services for unrepresented litigants in unlawful
detainer and family law matters provided by the Van Nuys Self-Help Center in Van
Nuys, California); Michael Millemann et al., Rethinking the Full-Service Legal Represen-
tational Model: A Maryland Experiment, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1178, 1185–86 (1997)
(reporting on a study of litigant satisfaction with one-time advice sessions on family law
matters with clinical law students from the University of Maryland and the University
of Baltimore); see also Steinberg, supra note 3, at 472–73 (discussing previous studies).
Outside the United States, some initial forays into researching self-help services in
Australia have also been conducted. See, e.g., Jeff Giddings & Michael Robertson, Self-
Help Legal Aid: Abandoning the Disadvantaged?, 12 CONSUMER POL’Y REV. 127, 128–31
(2002) (reporting findings from a focus group with self-help service providers). For the
purpose of this discussion, I am not including studies of services not characterized as
self-help, e.g., legal assistance provided by lay advocates for their clients in shelters, or by
institutional advocates working with district attorneys or law enforcement outside of a
court partnership.
224 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:203
shows that self-help makes a substantive difference to case outcomes,
or that it is as effective as full representation.111 The single study com-
paring outcomes for litigants receiving unbundled services, full repre-
sentation, and no representation, found that only full representation
resulted in better substantive outcomes.112 Notably, the third study,
which examined litigant satisfaction with brief family law advice
sessions and assistance with forms, found that litigants’ satisfaction
declined with the complexity of the case—which would presumably
benefit from more substantial attorney engagement.113
These primarily descriptive, qualitative studies are invaluable,
especially given how little we know about this subject and the
importance—indeed, urgency—of exploratory research in this field.
A different approach may be needed, however. In particular, studying
case outcomes has significant normative and conceptual limitations.114
A focus on case outcomes begs the question, what is an outcome?
Steinberg’s study points out important differences between proce-
dural justice outcomes (e.g., making it past default), and substantive
justice (getting a better end result).115 There is also a related issue
of what constitutes a successful outcome. Clients may have multiple
goals (e.g., being heard, pressing a cause), and winning might not be
the top priority.116 Additionally, there may be important questions
about what orders are granted or denied, even in a case that appears
111. Steinberg’s study found that unbundled services, which included ghostwritten
answers and one-time assistance with settlement negotiations, improved only defendants’
default rates, not their substantive outcomes. Steinberg, supra note 3, at 482. Litigants
“lost their homes just as often, faced just as few days to move out, and made payments to
their landlords with the same frequency, and in similar amounts.” Id. Even those receiv-
ing negotiation assistance fared no better than those proceeding without assistance. Id.
Similarly, the Van Nuys Report finds no difference between settlement outcomes for liti-
gants receiving assistance versus those receiving no assistance. VAN NUYS FINAL REPORT,
supra note 12, at 12 (finding that assisted litigants settled their cases with landlords at
about the same rate and on similar terms as unrepresented defendants who did not go
to the self-help center, went to trial as often, and had similar rates of non-appearance).
112. Steinberg, supra note 3, at 482.
113. Millemann et al., supra note 110, at 1186 (noting this may reflect the need for
greater attorney involvement in the process for those cases); see VAN NUYS FINAL REPORT,
supra note 12, at 14 (finding that litigants receiving unbundled services reported feeling
less prepared for court than those who had no representation at all, which the report inter-
prets as a result of having higher expectations).
114. See Jane H. Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Measuring Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 79, 80
(2013) (elaborating the challenges of measuring outcomes in ways that capture the many
desirable elements of justice); Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding
the Empirical Study of Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 105 (2013) (advocating for
an expansive, theory-based research agenda for access to justice).
115. See Steinberg, supra note 3, at 481.
116. Aiken & Wizner, supra note 114, at 81 (arguing that many clients are concerned
with a variety of factors in determining success, beyond “ ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ cases in the
formal sense”).
2016] DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE POLITICS OF SELF-HELP 225
“successful” on the merits. For example, protection orders provide
multiple types of potential relief.117 Do services help litigants under-
stand all available remedies and request all relief to which they are
entitled? Outcomes also include impacts on legal consciousness (e.g.,
how litigants come to understand their legal rights and obligations),
which differs from consumer satisfaction with services, and has not
yet been studied in this context.118
More generally, studies thus far have centered on individual
cases and litigants, rather than the systemic impacts of services.119
Legal service providers can act as points of access, and also as gate-
keepers, by determining who is eligible to enter the system.120 They
also help shape litigants’ stories into the types of narratives demanded
by courts.121 As observed by linguist Shonna Trinch in her study of
interactions between paralegals at a district attorney’s office and
Latina protection order applicants, “domestic violence narratives told
in sociolegal settings are joint productions, constructions produced
collaboratively” by survivors and the institutional actors assigned to
help them.122 How do self-help staff members perform this function?
Do they differ from other service providers? If so, how and why? Addi-
tionally, to the extent that self-help programs absorb or displace prior
models for assisting abuse survivors, what are the impacts on survi-
vors, advocates, advocacy organizations, and systemic advocacy?123
These questions suggest the importance of critically evaluating self-
help services in ways designed to identify and assess the manner in
which those services are provided, and the structural dynamics of
power between self-help legal services, survivors, and the legal sys-
tems to which survivors seek access.124
117. See supra Part I.A (discussing protection order remedies).
118. This relates to what Albiston and Sandefur call “demand side access to justice.”
See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 114, at 117 (“[W]e have only a very rudimentary
understanding of how people come to think about and act on their potentially justiciable
experiences and of the consequences of these experiences for them and for society.”).
119. See Richard L. Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism,
32 UCLA L. REV. 474, 577 (1985).
120. See id. (identifying legal aid attorneys as gatekeepers); see also Shonna L. Trinch,
The Advocate as Gatekeeper: The Limits of Politeness in Protective Order Interviews With
Latina Survivors of Domestic Abuse, 5 J. SOCIOLINGUISTICS 475, 476–77 (2001) (discussing
the gatekeeping function of advocates who are also institutional service providers).
121. See Shonna L. Trinch & Susan Berk-Seligson, Narrating in Protective Order
Interviews: A Source of Interactional Trouble, 31 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 383, 385 (2002)
(discussing the legal system’s preference for linear narratives).
122. Id. at 412; see Trinch, supra note 120, at 23 (noting that advocates and survivors
co-construct the abuse account presented to the court).
123. See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 114, at 114–16 (describing aspects of a “supply
side” theory of access to justice).
124. See Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323,
358–59 (2005) (advocating for a more socially situated, critical approach to the study of
legal consciousness).
226 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:203
B. The Present Research: Bellow Scholar Study (2014)
1. Research Locations
Data for this study was collected from two self-help programs run
as partnerships between nongovernmental organizations and county
courts in two western states. I will refer to these as Program A and
Program B.125 Both programs operate in courthouses located in
densely populated metropolitan areas and serve primarily women of
color.126 Additionally, data from Program A shows that most litigants
had little education, and spoke a language other than English.127
Program A operates several self-help center locations as a part-
nership between the county courts and a local legal aid organization
(LAO); the county provides space for the centers, which are managed
exclusively by the LAO. Staff members include volunteers, paid in-
terns, LAO attorneys (who review completed applications), and a full
time program director who oversees and manages the centers. This
program, which has been in its current form since 2006, serves more
than 4,000 individuals annually.128
Program B consists of a single self-help center run as a partner-
ship between the county and a local domestic violence services orga-
nization (DVSO). In addition to providing space and equipment, the
county staffs Program B with a director and four other full time
employees, and three part time staff members. The DVSO provides
funding for two additional full-time staff members.129 The program
was founded in 1995, and presently serves more than 5,000 people
per year.130
125. The programs and persons who participated in this study are not identified in
order to maintain their confidentiality. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study
(2014) (data on file with author) [hereinafter MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study].
126. Id. In 2009, an average of 78% of people who filed a protection order after receiving
services at Program A were women; 86.5% were racial/ethnic minorities. Data collected
at Program B in 2012 showed that protection order applicants were more than four times
as likely to be women than men; less than half were white. Id.
127. Id. In 2009, 86.5% of protection order applicants helped at Program A were racial/
ethnic minorities, 53% spoke a language other than English as a preferred language, and
only 26% had attended some college; less than 13% had a college degree. Given the links
between educational attainment and income disparity, a relatively low average income
in this group can be assumed. Id.; see, e.g., Steven Strauss, The Connection Between Educa-
tion, Income Inequality, and Unemployment, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2012, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-strauss/the-connection-between-ed_b_1066401
.html [http://perma.cc/6QJX-MH2P]. Similar data was not available for Program B.
128. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. This information is based on
2009 data drawn from new protection order cases filed at each program location during
four one-week periods. Id.
129. Id. After the data collection period, this was reduced to one staff member due to
budgeting constraints. Id.
130. Id. This information is based on 2012 data. Id.
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2. Overview of Services
In each program location, applicants begin the legal process by
filing ex parte for a temporary protection order, which may be granted,
denied outright, or denied and set for an evidentiary hearing. Pursu-
ant to state law, applicants may request orders that the adverse party
stay away from the applicant, refrain from specified conduct, and for
exclusive use of property, child support, spousal support, restitution,
and attorneys fees. Adverse parties may also be ordered to surrender
guns. If the court sets the matter for hearing, the applicant may seek
an order for a longer time.131 In both programs, non-attorney staff
members provide assistance to applicants with the process of prepar-
ing and filing applications. Staff members may also provide applicants
with printed information. At Program A, this includes information
about the legal process, including how to file and serve the applica-
tion, and how to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. At Program B,
staff members reviewing the application provide the applicant with
an information sheet that includes contact information for the DVSO,
and that lists considerations for safety planning.132 Beyond that, there
are several differences in the provision of services.
Most notably, staff members at Program A provide one-on-one
assistance for applicants in completing the application. A staff mem-
ber sits with the applicant and asks prompting questions based on
the application form about what orders the applicant wants and what
happened; the staff member also fills out the application forms on
a computer or by hand. Additionally, an attorney reviews each appli-
cation completed by a non-attorney staff member before it is filed.133
At Program B, there is no attorney supervision or review. Moreover,
applicants at Program B complete the application forms themselves
before meeting with a staff member. The completed form is then
reviewed by one of the two staff members from the DVSO; if it is very
busy, county-employed staff review applications as well. During this
process, staff members may ask the applicant clarifying questions
and add additional details and facts (such as dates) as a supplement
to the applicants’ declaration.
131. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study supra note 125. In the jurisdiction served by
Program A, the judge can grant a permanent order after a hearing, or continue a tem-
porary order for a longer period of time. State law at Program B requires the applicant
to request an extension of the temporary order on or subsequent to her application. The
temporary order can be extended for a maximum of six months after the hearing. Id.
132. I will analyze these documents in a separate article.
133. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. The attorney is usually off-
site. Staff members email or fax completed applications to the attorney for review. Appli-
cations completed by applicants without a staff member’s help, and then reviewed by a
staff member, are not reviewed by an attorney. Id.
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The programs also differ in how completed applications are
processed. At Program A, the applicant is responsible for filing the
completed application, delivering a file-stamped copy to the court-
room for review by the judge, and then taking any orders that result
to the sheriff’s window for service on the adverse party. In contrast,
Program B manages these administrative aspects of the application
process. Applicants leave the completed application at the program
office, and return there to pick up their order. However, the process
takes longer at this location. While applicants generally receive a
temporary order the same day they apply at Program A, it typically
takes two or more days to receive an order at Program B.
Additionally, the programs differ as to the delegation of labor
among staff members, and the terminology used to describe the roles
that staff members perform. At Program A, all staff members do the
same work in assisting applicants—except attorneys, who are usu-
ally not on site and whose sole role is reviewing applications—and
are referred to in program materials as advocates. At Program B,
there is a different division of labor. Front desk staff members at
Program B interact with all applicants and answer the phones. These
staff members answer applicants’ questions, conduct initial screen-
ing, and redirect people as deemed necessary; they also hand out the
application and provide instructions on filling it out. Staff members
in the back office review applications. Further, only the two DVSO
employees are called advocates, and are identified as such by a plac-
ard on each of their desks.
3. Methodology
This study uses qualitative, ethnographic methods intended
to situate courthouse self-help program activities within the larger
service systems of which they are a part, and in a larger socio-
political frame. To this end, the study employs traditional methods
for grounded, exploratory ethnographic research, including non-
participant observation of courthouse self-help services, activities,
and interactions (e.g., between litigants, staff members, and judges),
and informal, semi-structured interviews with everyday actors in the
field (e.g., staff members, legal aid attorneys, and survivor advocates
in the community).134 Additionally, these methods are augmented by
134. See ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH:
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY 12–13 (2007)
(“ ‘[G]rounded theory’ . . . [is] derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed
through the research process. In this method, data collection, analysis, and eventual theory
stand in close relationship to one another.”); see also id. at 11–12 (describing the variety
of sources from which qualitative data can be derived for grounded theory).
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review of secondary materials, such as informational pamphlets and
other documents distributed to litigants at Programs A and B, court
records, publicly available self-help service site evaluations, and ar-
chival and legislative research on the history and current status of
civil protection order laws. Archival research and interviews with
participants in the movement for protection order legislation were
also conducted on the connection between law reform, self-help, and
social movements for battered women and access to justice.
Insofar as the study focuses on a situated analysis of interactive
work processes within self-help programs, conducted for the purpose
of understanding impacts on survivors of domestic violence, the study
fits into what has been termed institutional ethnography.135 Institu-
tional ethnographers examine “work processes and study . . . how
they are coordinated, typically though texts and discourses of vari-
ous sorts.”136 The researcher’s focus is “on institutional case manage-
ment processes and the logic, thinking, and assumptions that support
them” rather than on individuals.137 The goal is to “discover systemic
problems and produce recommendations for longer lasting change.”138
In the desire to create change, this method is advocacy based, and
politically situated.139 Institutional ethnographers “take[ ] a stand-
point in the everyday world and of people whose lives are subordi-
nated to ruling practices.”140 Here, the standpoint is that of survivors
of domestic violence, “and the ways in which their needs and interests
are subordinate to those of intervening institutions and entities.”141
Accordingly, this study examines the power dynamics and relation-
ships within courthouse self-help programs and their bearing on
135. See Marjorie L. DeVault, Introduction: What is Institutional Ethnography?, 53
SOC. PROBS. 294, 294–95 (describing the field of institutional ethnography and providing
examples of research projects that use this methodology); ELIZABETH TOWNSEND, GOOD
INTENTIONS OVERRULED: A CRITIQUE OF EMPOWERMENT IN THE ROUTINE ORGANIZATION
OF MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 17–29 (1998) (describing the key processes of institutional
ethnography). As this project applies this inquiry to multiple locations, it can also be viewed
as a multi-sited ethnography. See George E. Marcus, Ethnography In/Of the World System:
The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography, 24 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 95 (1995) (de-
scribing a multi-sited approach to ethnographic inquiry).
136. DeVault, supra note 135, at 294.
137. Jane M. Sadusky et al., The Praxis Safety and Accountability Audit: Practicing a
“Sociology for People,” 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1031, 1034; see DeVault, supra note
135 (noting that the analytic goal of institutional ethnographers is “explication rather than
theory building”).
138. See Sadusky et al., supra note 137, at 1034.
139. Id.
140. MARIE CAMPBELL & FRANCES GREGOR, MAPPING SOCIAL RELATIONS: A PRIMER IN
DOING INSTITUTIONAL ETHNOGRAPHY 124 (2004).; see TOWNSEND, supra note 135, at 18
(noting that institutional ethnographers do not attempt to be objective outsiders or to
interpret “subjective feelings, meanings and perceptions of human experience”).
141. Sadusky, supra note 137, at 1035.
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access to justice for survivors trying to access the courts. The goal is
to listen to and observe “experiences of tension as a starting point for
tracing the actual activities and conditions of the everyday world to
the organizational processes that invisibly rule that experience.”142
In this Article, I focus primarily on an analysis of the interactions
between staff and applicants, as studied through observations con-
ducted by research team members at the two programs.143 Observa-
tions were recorded in field notes.144 Field notes were then analyzed
through an inductive process of open coding that identified recurring
themes, patterns, and topics; these became core categories for further
analysis.145 Additionally, notes concerning staff-applicant interactions
were analyzed and coded based on an initial typology of demeanor de-
veloped by Ptacek, discussed below.146 A holistic analysis of the data
was used to verify the analysis and make sure demeanor was analyzed
in context, and to relate demeanor to specific types of interactions as
distilled into core categories.147 Three research team members partici-
pated in analyzing and checking the data in order to confirm or
142. TOWNSEND, supra note 135, at 18.
143. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. Observations of program staff
took place at Program A over several months in 2009 and 2010, and at Program B from
December 2013 to August 2014. A total of 84 hours of staff observation data were tran-
scribed from these preliminary collections; over 150 hours of observation at other
courthouse locations (e.g., the protection order courtroom, and lobby areas outside the
courtroom) were collected and transcribed as well. Staff observations were conducted to
the point of saturation at Program B, in that no new variations (of demeanor types) or
contradictions were being observed. This data was consistent with comparative data
from Program A. Id. 
144. Id. Field notes consisted of two main types: logs of notes recorded simultaneously
or contemporaneously with observations in the field, and notes recorded surreptitiously
at opportune moments, so as not to influence or disturb what was being observed. The
former technique was used when observing front desk staff at Program B, while the latter
technique was used primarily when observing advocates interacting with applicants.
Notes jotted in the field were augmented with detail after leaving the field. Id.; see W.
LAWRENCE NEUMAN, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE AP-
PROACHES 398–402 (6th ed. 2006) (regarding techniques for recording notes in and out
of the field); JOHN LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE
OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS 108–16 (4th ed. 2006) (also on techniques for recording notes
in and out of the field).
145. See BARNEY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED
THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 105–13 (1967); see also Patricia A. Adler
& Peter Adler, Of Rhetoric and Representation: The Four Faces of Ethnography, 49 SOC.
Q. 1, 12 (2008) (describing the use of inductive analysis in ethnography).
146. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. Data collected from observations
of front desk staff at Program B made up the bulk of this analysis. However, this data
was checked against results of advocate observations at both programs to ensure consis-
tency of findings. As noted, no significant discrepancies in the data were found based on
location or staff type. Id.
147. Amy Lehrner & Nicole E. Allen, Still a Movement After All These Years?: Current
Tensions in the Domestic Violence Movement, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 656, 660
(2009) (describing a holistic approach to analyzing data).
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disconfirm the analysis. This process resulted in several adjustments
to the demeanor scale (and corresponding revisions to coded tran-
scripts) to achieve a more finely graded and consistent analysis.
Ultimately, all coded data was accounted for and incorporated
into the analysis of demeanor presented below.148
III. DEMEANOR AND SELF-HELP ASSISTANCE
A. Self-Help Assistance as Emotional Labor
The self-help center is a place of intense and sometimes volatile
emotions. Litigants come to the center speaking in the language of
needs, relationships, and emotions, and are met with varying degrees
of receptivity, care, and assistance. In this sense, the demeanor of
self-help staff is part of an emotional exchange, and the work of self-
help staff can be viewed as a form of emotional labor.149 In the sociol-
ogy of emotions, individuals are deemed to be engaged in emotional
labor when they have direct interactions with the public, create an
emotional state in others (e.g. gratitude or fear) through their inter-
actions, and the emotional dimensions of their work are regulated
(e.g., in the case of lawyers and judges, through rules of professional
conduct).150 Self-help staff members obviously engage with the public,
and perform their work in the emotionally volatile environment of the
family court. The very position of domestic violence advocate is de-
fined statutorily in terms of the emotional dimensions of their work as
support persons.151 The emotional presentation of self-help staff mem-
bers is also regulated.152 For example, staff members are evaluated in
terms of their emotional presentation and impact on applicants.153
Additionally, the emotional presentation of self-help staff mem-
bers conveys an authority that derives from their relationship to the
court. In his study of the judges in protection order hearings, James
148. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. Future articles will focus on
the work processes and relationships that shape demeanor.
149. See ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF
HUMAN FEELING 147 (1983) (defining emotional labor).
150. See PTACEK, supra note 26, at 96 (applying the concept of emotional labor to judges).
151. See AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE/ SEXUAL ASSAULT ADVOCATE CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS (2014), http://www.amer
icanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/domestic_violence1/Resources/statutory
summarycharts/2014%20Advocate%20Confidentiality%20Chart.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VJK7-JMFG] (compiling state laws defining advocates and advocate
privilege).
152. See VAN NUYS FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 7.
153. See, e.g., id. at 14.
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Ptacek characterized judicial demeanor as the “emotional presentation
of authority.”154 In Ptacek’s analysis, judges are inescapably cloaked
in the trappings of authority, such that their most casual interactions
in the courtroom are laden with significance.155 While self-help staff
members do not have the same symbolic power (or related decision-
making authority) as judges, they nonetheless represent the legal
system by virtue of their location in the courthouse and their role in
providing a gateway to the judicial decision maker. In this way, the
demeanor of self-help staff in their interactions with litigants is im-
bued with particular significance.156 The next section analyzes the
presentation of authority by self-help staff through the study and
categorization of demeanor.
B. Demeanor Typology for Self-Help Assistance
Drawing on work by sociologist Maureen Mileski,157 Ptacek’s
study of judicial demeanor utilized a typology of five demeanor cate-
gories: good-natured, bureaucratic, condescending, firm or formal,
and harsh.158 Subsequently, researcher Angela Moe Wan applied
Ptacek’s typology in her analysis of the demeanor of lay advocates
helping women with protection order applications in a mid-western
domestic violence services program, and found that the last three cat-
egories tended to co-occur.159 Upon analyzing the data from the current
study, it became apparent that some modification of the categories
used by Ptacek and Wan, and the addition of two new categories, was
necessary in order to capture the range of demeanors present and
to provide an adequately powerful lens with which to evaluate self-
help program services. This resulted in a typology of seven demeanor
categories: good-natured/supportive, token supportive, bureaucratic,
apathetic, firm or formal, harsh, and patronizing/condescending—a
demeanor type that typically, but not necessarily, co-occurs with
154. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 95 (emphasis omitted).
155. Id.
156. For example, in response to surveys, litigants using self-help centers in California
have reported that they believe center staff are knowledgeable, and also that they feel more
informed after using the center than they did previously. REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE, supra note 6, at 2. Given their unfamiliarity with the legal system how-
ever, unrepresented litigants have no point of comparison and little ability to evaluate
the services they receive. Thus, these results might mean little more than that litigants
responding to the survey liked self-help staff.
157. See Mileski, supra note 26.
158. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 98.
159. Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the Restraining Order Process: Observations
on a Court Advocacy Program, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 606, 621–25 (2000).
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other demeanor categories. Figure 1 compares my typology with those
established by Ptacek and Wan. My findings regarding each type are
described in turn below.
FIGURE 1
1. Good-Natured/Supportive
Individuals demonstrating good-natured/supportive demeanor
provide meaningful emotional and material support to applicants.160
Ptacek describes good-natured demeanor by judges toward battered
women seeking protection orders as, “us[ing] their authority to make
women feel welcome in the court, to express concern for their suffer-
ing, and to mobilize resources on their behalf.”161 These judges mini-
mized social distance and put applicants at ease by using a pleasant
tone of voice, maintaining eye contact, and encouraging applicants
to stand close to them.162 They showed empathy by acknowledging
the difficulty applicants faced in speaking about their abuse in court,
and took their time with each case; they acknowledged applicant’s
concerns, demonstrated concern for their safety, and made sure they
understood their criminal as well as civil options under the law.163
160. See PTACEK, supra note 26, at 99.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 99–100; see Wan, supra note 159, at 615–17 (describing the demeanor of
court commissioners in protection order hearings, and making similar findings).
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Similarly, in her study of advocates assisting battered women
with applications for protection orders, Wan describes good-natured
advocates as helping women feel welcome in their offices, and com-
fortable throughout the application process.164 Good-natured advo-
cates also helped women understand their options, such as alternative
ways to protect themselves outside the legal process, and respected
their decisions about how to proceed.165 Wan reports that taking time
with applicants and exhibiting patience were the most common ways
that advocates exhibited good-natured demeanor.166 For example,
Wan observed that advocates often worked through their lunch
breaks and stayed after hours to help women in need, and assisted
women by providing them referrals to shelters and other services.167
Good-natured advocates were also emotionally supportive—offering
kind words, hugs, and tissues.168 Good-natured demeanor was the
most frequently exhibited judicial demeanor in Ptacek’s study, and
Wan notes that many advocates exhibited good-natured demeanor
as well.169 Because the distinguishing feature of this category is its
supportive quality, rather than mere friendliness or pleasantness,
I have renamed it “good-natured/supportive” in order to distinguish
it from those less substantive qualities.
As in Ptacek and Wan’s studies, good-natured/supportive self-help
staff members at Programs A and B often exhibited this demeanor
through their patience and persistence in understanding the relevant
facts, explaining the protection order process, or otherwise helping
litigants understand how to use information or what to do. The man-
ner in which this demeanor manifested depended to some degree on
the nature of the staff member’s position. In general, however, the
extent of conduct meeting these criteria was meager at both program
locations, especially as compared to Ptacek and Wan’s descriptions.
For example, like the advocates observed by Wan,170 advocates at
Programs A and B sometimes demonstrated good-natured/supportive
demeanor by exhibiting patience when interviewing applicants or
reviewing applications. These advocates took the time necessary to
164. Wan, supra note 159, at 617–18.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 618.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 619. Among other examples, Wan describes advocates babysitting their
client’s children so they could attend court, offering to translate at hearings for Spanish-
speaking clients so that they would not have to reschedule their hearing for when a court
translator was available, and providing assistance with legal forms outside the protection
order process when it was necessary. Id.
169. While Wan didn’t quantify her findings, Ptacek found that 56% (10 of 18) of judges
observed exhibited good nature at least some of the time. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 100–01.
170. See Wan, supra note 159, at 617–18.
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tease out the relevant facts in order to support a request for relief, or
to understand the significance of an applicant’s concerns when it
was not immediately apparent. Advocates also demonstrated good-
natured/supportive demeanor when they addressed applicant’s ques-
tions about the legal process, and helped them understand their
options. Front desk staff members at Program B also demonstrated
good-natured/supportive demeanor by helping applicants under-
stand the significance of information about their case when they
researched case histories online.171 Front desk staff members also
occasionally offered to get more information from a supervisor to an-
swer an individual applicant’s questions, rather than merely treat-
ing the matter as beyond their ken, or offered encouraging words to
applicants.172 In these instances, staff members seemed genuinely
concerned about helping people who were using the court.
However, unlike in Wan’s study, even staff members demon-
strating good-natured/supportive demeanor at these programs did
not go out of their way to help applicants.173 They did not stay after
hours or do additional work to locate resources. They did not hug
applicants or demonstrate physical affection or support. Indeed, as
will be discussed further below, they frequently turned applicants
away without assistance or referrals. Moreover, far more common
than good-natured/supportive demeanor was what I term “token
supportive” demeanor.
2. Token Supportive
Staff members in this study demonstrated token supportive
demeanor—a category not considered by Ptacek or Wan—by simply
“being nice.” These staff members were often very pleasant and su-
perficially supportive. Their tone was warm, they made eye contact,
and sometimes minimized spatial distance by leaning forward toward
171. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. For example, a front desk staff
person who was asked by an applicant to look up whether the adverse party had been
served with a permanent order noticed when reviewing the case history that both parties
had been present at the hearing where the order was issued. This staff person explained
to the applicant that even though the adverse party had not been served with the order,
service would be deemed completed and no additional service was necessary. Because the
staff member went beyond a rote answer to the question (e.g., responding that the adverse
party had not been served), the response is deemed to exhibit good-natured supportive
demeanor. Id.
172. Id. For instance, on one occasion a staff member encouraged a woman who was
frustrated with the court process to go to her hearing, telling her, “don’t give up; they will
get him,” even though the woman had a child support case, not a domestic violence case,
and had come into the wrong office. Id.
173. See Wan, supra note 159, at 618–19.
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the litigant while they spoke. Sometimes staff members exhibiting
this demeanor also lowered their voices while speaking to a litigant,
engendering a conspiratorial or more intimate tone that suggested
a special rapport or an offering of extra support. Staff members some-
times also offered token support by making minimally supportive
comments to applicants, such as stating, cheerfully, “good job” upon
receiving a completed form. However, no substantively useful informa-
tion was provided during these exchanges, nor gained for the litigant’s
benefit. In this way, token supportive demeanor did not meaning-
fully extend beyond the staff member’s affect, and therefore did not
reach the level of demeanor that was good-natured/supportive. It
might also be considered patronizing or condescending at times,
which is discussed more below. This form of demeanor is nonethe-
less distinguished from bureaucratic demeanor, discussed next, in
the level of warmth, courteousness or pleasantness typically demon-
strated in the exchange, rendering it relatively personable, albeit
superficial, in nature.
3. Bureaucratic
By far the most common demeanor observed at both Programs
A and B was what Ptacek and Wan term bureaucratic demeanor.174
Ptacek describes bureaucratic judges as passive and detached from
the women who appeared before them seeking protection orders.175
While these judges might be courteous, they remained “emotionally
flat” by displaying little empathy, and sometimes appearing “impa-
tient, rushed, or bored.”176 Bureaucratic judges appeared focused on
completing tasks efficiently.177 Similarly, Wan reports that bureau-
cratic advocates were focused on efficient processing of protection
order requests and remained distanced from women’s concerns.178
They spoke in a quick, rehearsed manner, demonstrated impatience
with applicant’s questions, frequently turned away applicants who
arrived only a few minutes late, and failed to offer referrals.179
Consistent with these findings, bureaucratic staff members at
Programs A and B provided generic, perfunctory responses to liti-
gants’ concerns and questions. As one of my research assistants de-
scribed these staff members, “a machine could replace them.”180 At
174. See PTACEK, supra note 26, at 101; Wan, supra note 159, at 619.
175. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 101.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Wan, supra note 159, at 620–21.
179. Id.
180. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
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Program A, staff members exhibiting bureaucratic demeanor seldom
deviated from the prompts in the software as they completed appli-
cation forms; they did not offer any explanation for legal terms (e.g.,
distinguishing legal and physical custody), or ask clarifying questions
of the applicant. Similarly, at Program B, bureaucratic front desk
staff members gave applicants routinized instructions without regard
to individual circumstances.
For example, bureaucratic staff members at Program B routinely
redirected applicants to a separate, emergency protection order pro-
cess when the adverse party was identified as being in jail, without
attempting to ascertain if that was the best process for the applicant.
This was significant because while an emergency order (which in that
jurisdiction is only available when the adverse party is in custody)
can be obtained in an expedited manner, it is only available for ten
days, during which time the applicant will have to make arrange-
ments to return to court to request an extension, as well as for the
hearing on the extension, which may be onerous.181 These staff mem-
bers also routinely instructed litigants completing applications to
describe the abuse in reverse chronological order, and to focus only
on recent events, although this instruction might not serve survivors
of stalking or other conduct that was not obviously abusive without
providing greater context.182
Bureaucratic self-help staff at both programs also frequently
turned away applicants without assistance or referrals. This could
occur because the applicant was deemed ineligible for services (e.g.,
the applicant did not have the requisite relationship with the adverse
party, or domestic violence had not occurred),183 or because staff mem-
bers had stopped taking applications for the day. At Program B, for
example, staff members stopped allowing new applications two hours
before closing time, regardless of how many applicants were waiting
to see an advocate at that time. Applicants were routinely turned
away from the center when they came only fifteen or twenty minutes
after staff members stopped taking new applications. On several
of those occasions applicants were visibly frightened or expressed
181. Id. According to the DVSO Program Director, this practice also burdened the
DVSO, which managed the emergency order process, by taking up staff time with non-
emergency matters. Id.
182. See infra Part IV.B.2 (providing an example of how this approach can discour-
age claims).
183. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. Theoretically, the programs
did not screen for eligibility, but helped all who wanted to apply. However, researchers
observed routine screening of applicants for eligibility at both locations. Id.; see infra
Part IV.B.1 (discussing how staff members shape protection order applications, including
by discouraging claims).
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concern about their safety. Although the staff have the telephone
number to the local domestic violence services hotline—indeed, they
routinely redirect applicants to this number to apply for emergency
orders—not one of these individuals was referred to the hotline.
Applicants at Program A were also routinely turned away without
referrals when advocates determined they could not assist more ap-
plicants before closing time. Sometimes applicants had already waited
for a lengthy period of time (e.g., on one occasion, ninety minutes),
which visibly added to their sense of frustration and distress. When
applicants expressed concern about their safety in the meantime, they
were told, “well, that’s the process”184 or “that’s all we offer here”185
and were not given referrals to shelters, police, or other services.
While Wan observed bureaucratic advocates looking down or
feigning work or being busy in order to deflect applicants’ questions
or concerns,186 bureaucratic self-help staff members more often used
the legal system and legal hierarchy to deflect applicants’ questions
and distance themselves from the process. For example, a self-help
staff member told an applicant that she did not know why a request
for a protection order was denied, “because I’m not the judge.”187
When asked by an applicant why she couldn’t be seen by a judge that
day, another staff member answered, “this is a legal process and we
have to take the requisite steps.”188 Bureaucratic staff members some-
times created social distance by being curt. For example, one staff
member told an applicant who asked if the process was free, “we
prefer to say there is no charge for a protection order.”189 In general,
at both locations, bureaucratic staff members most often responded
to litigants’ inquiries by telling them what they could not do for them
(e.g., “I cannot offer legal advice,” “I cannot discuss these issues with
you,” and “we don’t call anyone on your behalf”), but did not offer sug-
gestions for where litigants might go for legal or other assistance.190
These staff members implied they were constrained by protocol as
they put up barriers for litigants without offering alternatives.
4. Apathetic
Self-help staff members also occasionally exhibited apathetic
demeanor—another addition to the categories used by Ptacek or Wan.
184. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
185. Id.
186. Wan, supra note 159, at 621.
187. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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Given the lack of empathy exhibited by bureaucratic staff members,
the distinction between bureaucratic and apathetic demeanor is
subtle. Yet, unlike bureaucratic staff members, those demonstrating
apathy did not reference legal hierarchies to justify their response,
or suggest a deflected request was contrary to some protocol. In this
way, while bureaucratic demeanor is impersonal and routine, apa-
thetic demeanor is distinguished by a seemingly personal lack of
interest in helping a litigant. For example, one front desk staff mem-
ber at Program B exhibited apathy when he repeatedly told an anx-
ious applicant in the office that he would be with her “in one minute,”
while staying on the phone with someone else and making no visible
attempt to end the call or get other help from another staff member
as the woman in front of him began to pace and fret agitatedly.191 On
another occasion, a staff member at the same location lost interest
in trying to resolve a litigant’s issue and told the litigant dismissively,
“do what you want.”192 Similarly, an advocate at Program B demon-
strated disinterest in resolving a litigant’s problem with a court sched-
uling conflict (he had agreed to a return date set during his hearing,
and then remembered a conflicting commitment) when she told him
flatly, “there’s nothing I can offer you.”193 As the exchange continued,
it became clear that this was not precisely true; rather, she did not
want to exert the trouble to find the answer to a rather complex pro-
cedural issue that was outside the normal range of questions. The
more personal character of apathetic demeanor sometimes segued
into firm or formal demeanor.
5. Firm or Formal
Firm or formal demeanor tends to involve “a tone of moral
authority,” and to emphasize social distance or hierarchy between
the parties—specifically, the superior social position of the individ-
ual exhibiting this demeanor over another.194 As Ptacek describes,
“[u]nlike the passivity of bureaucratic demeanor, judges assuming
a firm or formal tone take an active stance and accentuate their
power.”195 These judges are impatient, strict, and express an expec-
tation of deference from the protection order applicants appearing
before them.196 Similarly, Wan describes firm or formal advocates as
asserting the superiority of their legal knowledge over applicants, and
191. Id.
192. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
193. Id.
194. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 102.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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becoming short tempered or impatient with applicants who need more
help or question the advocate’s instructions or advice.197
Self-help staff members tended to exhibit firm or formal de-
meanor when they were responding to litigant requests that they
thought were inappropriate or that they did not want or know how to
answer. For example, returning to the exchange regarding the sched-
uling conflict recounted above, the advocate’s tone grew more annoyed
as the applicant pressed to change his hearing date. She admonished
him, “you stood there and told the judge you would be there that
day.”198 When the applicant protested that the judge had seemed
understanding at the hearing and perhaps could accommodate the
change, she retorted by invoking the formal (and impliedly binding)
significance of the courtroom exchange: “It was not just you and the
judge having coffee talking about it, it was you standing in a court-
room stating on camera that you would be available that day.”199 Ulti-
mately she explained that the applicant could file a motion to request
a different hearing date, but emphasized that the judge might not
grant it. She implied that the applicant was making trouble for the
court, stating, “now you want to see about changing the court date
you just agreed to; it’s not easy for the court to just accommodate
everything that comes up.” 200
On another occasion, two advocates at Program A grew firm or
formal in their demeanor when an applicant returned to ask if she
could modify her application to ask for restitution of damages caused
by the abuser—a form of relief that was available in this jurisdiction,
but which the self-help center did not inform applicants about as part
of the application process. The applicant had learned about this relief
after submitting her application form, and wanted to amend her appli-
cation to add a claim. When the advocates responded that she could
not amend the form, the applicant grew upset and challenged them,
asserting, “Why can’t it be amended? Most things can be changed.” 201
The advocates argued that obtaining damages is not what protection
orders are “about.” 202 Protection orders are for protecting people, they
opined: that is their main purpose and why they were granted and
what the judge cares about. In this context, the advocates reasoned,
it was only appropriate to seek money needed “for basic survival, for
197. Wan, supra note 159, at 624. Wan considers this category together with condescend-
ing and harsh demeanor, and refers to the combined category as “firm or condescending.”
Id. at 621.
198. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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people who do not have money to eat.” 203 The implication was that
seeking any money beyond bare necessity in a protection order was
greedy and suggested one did not deserve protection.
Staff members also assumed a firm or formal demeanor with
applicants whom they later reported to researchers they believed
were abusers masquerading as victims. On these occasions advocates
grew cold in tone, impatient, and dismissive. Sometimes they actively
discouraged the applicant from filing the protection order. For exam-
ple, when an adverse party to a protection order came into Program B
and asked about getting a protection order against the applicant,
whom he said persisted in calling him on the phone, the staff member
at the front desk responded that he should simply erase his messages
or change his number. “The protection order is about protection,” she
asserted, “not just the person saying they don’t like someone or you
got a phone call you don’t like.” 204
On other occasions, staff members turned what might be a
routine, bureaucratic response into one infused with firm or formal
demeanor through tone. For example, front desk staff members at
Program B sometimes described the application process in a manner
that emphasized its potentially laborious, lengthily, and uncertain
nature. As one staff member told an applicant, “you have to fill out
a nine or ten page form, and then in two or three days you will find
out if the judge granted it. Until the judge decides and the adverse
party is served, everything is the same as before.” 205 By delivering
this discouraging soliloquy in an impatient and snippy tone to an
applicant who had expressed worry and fear while inquiring if she
could get an order the same day, the staff member’s demeanor was,
in this instance, firm or formal.
6. Harsh
As the term implies, harsh demeanor goes beyond a firm or
formal demeanor to become abrasive and nasty, intimidating, and/or
punishing. Ptacek and Wan found that harsh demeanor toward appli-
cants was exhibited infrequently.206 Ptacek observed only one incident
in this category, in which the judge raised his voice and exhibited
anger and disdain for the applicant.207 Wan categorized incidents in
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See PTACEK, supra note 26, at 104; Wan, supra note 159, at 626.
207. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 104.
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which advocates expressed obvious frustration with women seeking
their help, while also expressing condescension, as harsh.208
As in Ptacek and Wan’s studies, harsh demeanor was observed
with relative infrequency in this study. Even though the message
delivered in some exchanges might be viewed as harsh, the manner
in which it was delivered was more often bureaucratic or firm or
formal. However, staff members exhibiting bureaucratic, or firm or
formal, demeanor sometimes escalated into harsh demeanor. One
example comes from another instance of an applicant asking whether
a judge could see her the same day. When the front desk staff member
told her that was impossible, the applicant protested, “My kids and
I are scared to death that he is going to kill us; we need something
now!” 209 At first the staff member responded in a bureaucratic man-
ner, referring to the need for compliance with the “legal process.” 210
Then, referring to an informational sheet provided to the applicant
with the application forms, the staff member’s tone shifted to con-
tempt and annoyance as she added, “if you had read this, you would
know that you were not going to be speaking to a judge today, al-
right?” 211 On another occasion, a staff member at the same location
exhibited harsh demeanor to an applicant who was confused about
the process and had questions about how to complete service of his
temporary protection order. As the applicant left, looking frustrated,
the staff member stated angrily, “If you don’t want to listen to me,
you can go help yourself !” 212 Overall, however, only a total of four in-
cidents of escalation into harsh demeanor by a staff member were
observed at the two programs.
7. Patronizing/Condescending
Ptacek identified condescending demeanor as a separate category,
involving paternalistic “joking,” and trivializing and patronizing de-
meanor toward applicants.213 Condescending judges encouraged
women seeking protection orders to “smile” or minimized the serious-
ness of the abuse (e.g., asking a crying applicant if she and her abu-
sive husband might get back together, while noting that she took out
the protection order on Valentine’s Day).214 While Ptacek analyzed
condescending demeanor separately, Wan found that condescending
208. See Wan, supra note 159, at 624–25.
209. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 103.
214. Id.
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demeanor tended to occur together with firm or formal and harsh
demeanor among the advocates she observed, and did not provide an
example of demeanor that was specifically condescending.215
In a somewhat different finding, staff members in this study
tended to exhibit condescending demeanor with other demeanors,
but did not always do so. Moreover, while condescending demeanor
sometimes accompanied firm or formal and harsh demeanor (one
example being the staff member’s admonishment to the applicant
who wanted to be seen by the judge the same day, recounted above),
it could accompany other demeanors as well. Further, when it accom-
panied demeanor that was otherwise friendly or at least minimally
helpful, it was perhaps better described as patronizing. Given the
close relationship between condescension and patronizing demeanor,
I combine these into a single category of patronizing/condescending.
Additionally, although this demeanor was only observed occurring
with other categories of demeanor in this study, it is reasonable to
suppose that—like the condescending judges in Ptacek’s study—
patronizing/condescending demeanor could predominate in an interac-
tion such that a staff member’s demeanor could be best characterized
as patronizing/condescending.216 Therefore, I maintain it as a distinct
category, as depicted above in Figure 1.217
As in Ptacek’s analysis of condescending demeanor, patronizing/
condescending demeanor at Programs A and B tended to trivialize
litigants’ concerns and disregard their humanity.218 For example, one
staff member exhibited patronizing/condescending demeanor when
she stated in front of an applicant speaking English with an accent
that she needed help because she could not understand the appli-
cant (who was perfectly understandable to the researcher observing).
It also tended to assume the superiority of the staff member’s knowl-
edge and position. For example, various staff members stated that
they would assist applicants while opining that they did not believe
the applicants’ requested order would be granted, thereby implying
not only that they knew better than the applicant but were doing
them a favor. From another perspective, the reward of more passive
and accepting behavior from litigants with more courteous, good-
natured, or even supportive demeanor is also patronizing. Individual
litigants might not be aware of this, but the critical assessment
215. See Wan, supra note 159, at 624–25.
216. See PTACEK, supra note 26, at 103–04.
217. The capacity of this category to co-occur with other demeanor types is depicted
in Figure 2, infra.
218. PTACEK, supra note 26, at 103.
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of demeanor across multiple litigants helps bring the phenomenon
to light.
IV. EXPOSING THE FAÇADE OF NEUTRALITY
A. Demeanor as Regulatory
Staff members and administrators at Programs A and B empha-
sized that the same services were provided to everyone. In particular,
interviews and informal conversations with staff members and
administrators at these programs revealed an ethic of neutrality; a
belief that self-help services can and should be provided without a de-
termination of who is and who is not a victim. As described by the pro-
gram director of the DVSO partnering with the court at Program B,
this meant that advocates at the self-help center did not determine
whether an individual applicant was an actual survivor of domestic
violence. This distinguished self-help advocates from other advocates
for the DVSO, such as those who accompanied clients to court for
their hearings and supported them through the court process, which
I will call independent advocates. Independent advocates used their
experience and training to determine whether or not a potential client
was a survivor and therefore qualified to receive advocacy services.
Sometimes this also entailed meeting with the director to discuss the
case before making a determination.219 In contrast, self-help center
services were supposed to be provided to anyone who wanted to file
an application, and nominally met the requirements of the statute.220
Furthermore, although both programs appropriate the language of
advocacy by referring to at least some staff members as advocates,
they simultaneously distance themselves from the rhetoric of advo-
cacy by emphasizing that staff members do not actually advocate on
behalf of any litigant; instead, they claim to act as advocates in a gen-
eral way by providing all applicants with information about the protec-
tion order process. The goal is one of treating litigants with sameness.
Yet, at least two important things become apparent as we proceed
through the types of demeanor outlined above. First, a range of de-
meanors often appears within the span of a single interaction—some-
times simultaneously, as observed by Wan,221 but also consecutively.
219. The program director noted that she had tried to conduct trainings on criteria for
determining victimization, but it was difficult to quantify and came down to intuition
and experience. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
220. Id. The program director at Program A went further, telling me that the program
was there to help anyone who wanted to file for a protection order. Id.
221. “Because so many of the interactions that exemplified one of the demeanors also
exemplified the other two, it seemed appropriate to consider them simultaneously.” Wan,
supra note 159, at 621.
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Second, a close observation of these encounters leads to the conclusion
that demeanor in this setting has a regulatory function.222 Specifi-
cally, demeanor becomes more distant or formal, and sometimes
harsh, as litigants resist the limited range of acceptable expression
of need and self-interest allotted to them—for example, by asking to
change a hearing date or amend a previously submitted form. In this
way, litigants are not treated in a neutral fashion; rather, more firm
or harsh demeanor can be viewed as punishment for some.
1. Sanctioning Self-Advocacy
The regulatory function of demeanor relates to what Mileski
calls “situational sanctions,” which she observed when studying the
demeanor of criminal court judges.223 Judges imposing situational
sanctions treated defendants in a harsh or severe manner, sometimes
openly reprimanding defendants in the courtroom. Typically judges
reserved this demeanor for defendants who disrupted the courtroom
or showed disrespect to staff, and those who had committed lesser
crimes.224 With regard to the latter, judges more often showed firm
demeanor to defendants in misdemeanor cases than felony cases, with
situational sanctions increasing inversely to material penalties.225
As Mileski reflects:
Perhaps the judge can afford to be routine and impersonal in . . .
[more serious] cases: the charges alone extend a good deal of moral
authority and official condemnation. Accordingly, the judge can
be impersonal, allowing the rules themselves to impart official
morality. When the charge is not serious in the legal hierarchy
of offenses, the judge more often attempts to impress upon the
defendant the seriousness of the matter. Formal and informal
authority mesh in such a way as to homogenize condemnation
across the categories of offense.226
Unlike judges, self-help staff members are not expected to wield
moral authority over litigants while performing their duties. However,
222. See Goffman, supra note 27, at 473 (noting that the violation of rules of conduct
can lead to social sanctions).
223. See Mileski, supra note 26, at 521–23 (distinguishing material sanctions from
situational sanctions and noting that “[t]he judge traditionally has been a moral agent
not only in his actions but also in his style”).
224. Id. at 523, 525 (reporting that most judges behaved in a bureaucratic manner, re-
maining detached and affectively neutral).
225. Id. at 525. As Mileski notes, in these instances “the judge’s demeanor does not
parallel the gradations in the law; instead it seemingly complements these gradations.”
Id. (italics in original).
226. Id. at 525–26.
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in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the self-help center, staff
members did distinguish among applicants for protection orders in
ways amounting to situational sanctions. Applicants who were subject
to sanctions were often engaged in self-advocacy, and sanctions tended
to escalate when applicants persisted with requests for assistance
or information against staff members’ instructions or advice. In con-
trast, applicants who were met with bureaucratic demeanor were
most often passive or compliant with the self-help process; they did
not “make waves” by asking for additional help, raising unusual is-
sues, or showing excessive emotion. Passive or compliant applicants
were sometimes also rewarded with the friendliness and camaraderie
associated with token good-natured demeanor, or even with the en-
hanced assistance, explanations, and advice associated with good-
natured/supportive demeanor.
2. Punishing Imperfect Victims
Staff members’ responses also overlapped with stereotypes about
domestic violence victims which identify deserving victims as pas-
sive rather than self-asserting. By rewarding more passive applicants
and sanctioning those who fell outside the stereotype, staff members
reinforced—whether intentionally or not—a dominant trope about
appropriate behavior for victims under the guise of neutrality. This
dynamic is illustrated by Figure 2, which depicts the range of staff
member demeanor in relation to the range of applicant compliance
with expectations of passivity within the perfect victim trope.
FIGURE 2
Additionally, men seeking assistance were sometimes treated
with a suspicion that was not extended to most female applicants,
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possibly because staff members perceived men as perpetrators rather
than victims. Although too few interactions with men were observed
to draw conclusions about the intersection of gender and racial and/or
ethnic bias against men, the stereotype that men are not legitimate
victims in need of protection may be more likely for men of color.227
For example, a middle aged African American man seeking to file
a protection order application at Program B was asked to show identi-
fication, and the staff member looked him up on the computer before
assisting him, presumably checking to see if an order had been filed
against him in the past. No other applicant was observed being asked
for identification before filing an application.
More generally, staff members issuing situational sanctions often
showed a startling lack of empathy for the circumstances routinely
faced by applicants seeking help from the court. For example, an ad-
vocate at Program A withdrew emotionally and grew cold and aloof
after a young female applicant asked if she could return to court to
finish the process the next day because she had to leave to pick up
her child from school. The following afternoon would be better, she
explained, because she thought she could arrange for childcare. After
the applicant left, the advocate said this was a “pet peeve” of hers,
and described feeling annoyed with applicants whom she thought did
not take the court process seriously enough.228
Staff members expressing such views appeared to identify more
with the court than with the mostly low-income women coming to the
center for help. The tenor of their complaints also suggested that
these staff members felt personally unappreciated for their emotional
labor. These feelings could have several causes. Similar to the appli-
cants, advocates at these programs were racially diverse, and most
were women.229 However, some were young people who had been to
college and were deciding what to do next with their lives or planning
to attend graduate school; others were financially able to dedicate
themselves to volunteer work. Thus, differences of identity, including
the middle class status of some staff members, may have impacted
interactions with applicants. On the other hand, some staff members
were part-time workers earning just above the minimum wage. Per-
haps these staff members felt unappreciated by the program as well
as the litigants for their emotional labor. Staff members’ attitudes may
also reflect the pervasive stereotypes about victims discussed above,
227. See MacDowell, Theorizing from Particularity, supra note 63, at 7 (discussing
stereotypes that apply to men of color in protection order hearings).
228. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
229. Id. Of approximately nine staff members observed at Program A, and ten at
Program B, all were women except one; one staff person was African American, one Asian,
three Latino/a, and the rest white. Id.
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as well as culturally pervasive tropes that characterize the poor as
unwilling to help themselves and underserving of assistance.230
The point here is not to establish a causal relationship between
any single factor and staff member demeanor. Rather, these shifts
in demeanor demonstrate the illusory nature of neutrality in self-help
services. This lack of neutrality and its potential relationship to bias
and stereotype should be of concern regardless of its cause. The lack
of neutrality in providing self-help services is also demonstrated by
the ways in which staff members shaped protection order applica-
tions, which is discussed in the next section. This discussion shows
how ceremonial aspects of behavior relate to substantive conduct
and material consequences.
B. Shaping the Protection Order Application
1. Excluding, Discouraging, and Withholding
One way that staff members shaped the remedies sought or
obtained by applicants was by excluding assistance with certain types
of relief, and discouraging applicants who sought disfavored relief.
As noted above, advocates at Program A did not prompt applicants on
whether they wanted to seek restitution, and actively discouraged
an applicant from modifying her application to seek this relief. Staff
members also routinely failed to ask applicants if they wanted to seek
an order for attorney fees, which were also available through the pro-
tection order process. At Program B, where applicants complete the
forms themselves, the application asks whether the applicant wants
to seek restitution of wages as a result of the abuse, which is the only
form of restitution available. However, the application does not men-
tion attorney fees, which are also available, and none of the advocates
that I spoke with informed applicants about this relief; rather, advo-
cates chose to withhold this information.
Staff members and administrators voiced various explanations
for not assisting with economic relief or fees. For example, when
asked about this practice, several staff members associated with
Program B expressed concern that if applicants requested attorney
230. See Goffman, supra note 27, at 473–74 (observing that rules of conduct consist
of both obligations and expectations). For a discussion of the pervasiveness of stereotypes
about the undeserving poor, including components of race and gender, see Ann Cammett,
Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J.L. &
SOC. JUST. 233, 245 (2014). For a detailed analysis of the ways in which the organization
of work within self-help centers shapes demeanor, see Elizabeth L. MacDowell, From
Victims to Litigants, 67 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2016) [hereinafter MacDowell, From
Victims to Litigants].
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fees then judges might encourage adverse parties to seek them as
well, and might grant them to the adverse party if an applicant’s pro-
tection order was denied.231 Others expressed concern that applicants
did not come prepared with supporting documentation required for
economic remedies, or that such requests would take up too much
time and strain already limited resources. However, the firm or for-
mal demeanor of staff members in response to an applicant’s efforts
to obtain restitution suggests that such policies resonate with a belief
that these efforts are inappropriate for victims to pursue.232 More-
over, the lack of assistance with these remedies obviously effects the
relief requested by applicants coming through these programs.
Self-help staff members sometimes also discouraged would-be
applicants from applying for a protection order, thus influencing
whether the protection order would be sought at all. For example, a
front desk person at Program B was observed stating unequivocally
to a would-be applicant, “I can guarantee you are not going to get a
[protective order] for something that happened one year ago.” 233 In
fact, while most staff members expressed the view that stating an
opinion on any applicant’s case was outside of their job description,
staff members frequently did give their opinions on the availability
of protection orders in particular cases. Another advocate was ob-
served telling an applicant, “I don’t think they will grant the order
but I will go ahead and submit the application.” 234 Staff members
sometimes stated their opinions forcefully, as in the prior examples,
but the process of conveying an opinion on the viability of an order
was often more subtle.
For example, applicants at Program A were screened using ques-
tions about the most recent incidents of abuse. In one such exchange,
an applicant reported to the advocate interviewing her that the most
recent incident involved her estranged husband standing outside her
front door and not saying anything. The incident prior to that involved
him refusing to take their young son for a prearranged visitation. The
applicant also reported that he was texting her many times every day.
231. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125. Some of these individuals were
also involved in the statewide process of creating the protection order application. This
might also explain why the availability of attorney fees was not indicated on the form. Id.
232. Id. This issue also arose in the context of requests for child and spousal support,
which were available through the protection order process at both locations. While staff
members at both programs did ask applicants if they wanted to apply for child or spousal
support, they did not assist them with the additional financial disclosure paperwork re-
quired for these requests. As a result, applicants seeking child or spousal support rou-
tinely had their requests denied or had to return to court again so the matter could be
considered after the paperwork was completed and served. Id.
233. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
234. Id.
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In response, the advocate focused on identifying physical violence,
repeatedly asking, “There hasn’t been any violence? But what about
physical violence?” 235 Her tone conveyed that she was dubious about
the applicant’s claims. While this applicant persevered and obtained
assistance, another applicant might have grown discouraged and
left.236 Similarly, an advocate at Program B admitted that she dis-
couraged people with what she perceived as weak facts from filing
their applications, because she thought they would have a harder
time getting an order in the future if it was denied now, even if a
future incident warranted protection. Although she claimed to leave
the decision of whether to file up to the applicant, her opinion would
certainly be influential to someone unfamiliar with the process.
While providing informed opinion may be valuable to applicants,
in these settings staff members’ opinions were largely unaccounted
for in self-help processes, not informed by established advocacy prin-
ciples, and shared within an environment that was not focused on
the best interests of applicants. Staff members also influenced the
application process in ways that were invisible to applicants. In ad-
dition to wholesale exclusion of help with certain remedies, staff
members withheld suggestions, opinions, and other assistance selec-
tively from applicants they disfavored, while providing others with
the substantive assistance characteristic of good-natured/supportive
demeanor. Thus, for example, one applicant might receive greater
assistance with identifying the relevant facts and including them in
his or her application than another, based on criteria that may have
nothing to do with the substance of his or her claims. It is probably
unrealistic and perhaps undesirable to expect staff members to treat
everyone uniformly. However, in the absence of rigorous training and
other support, and mechanisms for accountability to the public, self-
help center staff members react to an emotionally volatile environ-
ment in ways that may negatively impact survivors and limit access
to the court.
2. Limiting Narratives
Interactions between self-help staff and applicants also shaped
the narratives about abuse that applicants shared with the court in
235. Id.
236. Ultimately, the applicant produced a police report documenting that her ex-
husband had raped her two years before. The advocate exclaimed, “That’s what I’m looking
for!” and assisted the applicant in completing her forms. In the course of completing the
application the applicant reported recent, persistent cyberharassment and stalking in-
cluding 20 text messages a day from the adverse party asking to have sex with her.
MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
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ways that might limit access to relief. For example, as illustrated by
the story related above, staff members sometimes emphasized the im-
portance of physical abuse in ways that discouraged applicants from
revealing or communicating about other types of abuse for which
relief was available.
Legal scholars have noted that most domestic violence survivors
assume that only physical violence is relevant to their claims for
relief.237 This problem is exacerbated by the use of undefined terms
that applicants might understand as referring to physical violence,
rather than emotional, economic, or other types of cognizable abuse.
In particular, staff members at both programs typically asked appli-
cants to describe “incidents” or “events” of domestic violence, without
defining those terms. These terms also suggested discrete events,
and were unlikely to elicit information about patterns or other tem-
poral details that might be necessary to contextualize the abuse.
Additionally, both programs encouraged applicants to start with
the most recent incident and work their way backwards, focusing on
recent events.238 This may be an efficient and practical way to proceed
in many cases. However, as illustrated by the story above, cases in-
volving stalking behavior may be particularly difficult to elicit with
a reverse chronology, and focusing on recent events may make it dif-
ficult to understand their significance. Excluding further background
on the abuse can also negatively impact an applicant’s case in family
court, for example if she tries to raise earlier incidents of abuse to
support a request for custody.239 Lay advocates in the community
served by Program B reported that applicants they accompanied to
court were sometimes precluded from putting on evidence about inci-
dents of abuse omitted from their protection order applications, and
even if they were allowed to put on the evidence, they seemed to lose
credibility with the judge.
Self-help staff also created barriers for applicant narratives about
abuse with policies for reporting cases to child protective services. At
Program B, advocates routinely reported cases where they believed
237. See Stoever, Freedom from Violence, supra note 65, at 348–49.
238. As recounted previously, staff members at Program B instructed applicants to
complete their supporting declarations in this manner. One staff member told an ap-
plicant to only describe events that occurred within the last 30 days. Another explained,
“two or three months ago, that’s not recent. Two or three days ago, that’s recent.”
MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125; see supra, Part III.
239. About half the states, including the states where Programs A and B are located,
have legal presumptions that a parent found to have committed domestic violence is unfit
to be awarded sole or joint custody. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT
JUDGES, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION STATES (2013), http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files
/chart-rebuttble-presumption.pdf [http://perma.cc/2DUN-6V2P] (compiling state statutes
for jurisdictions employing such a presumption).
252 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:203
a child was exposed to domestic violence. Advocates claimed that
these reports were in response to pressure from judges hearing the
protection order cases, who did not want to make the reports them-
selves. Knowledge of reporting to child protective services might
travel through the community and result in self-censorship of de-
tails involving children.240 Additionally, as noted earlier, survivors
who could benefit from a protective order might be discouraged from
using self-help services and from going to court if they believe they
will be reported to child protective services as a result.
These findings comport with Trinch’s study showing how nar-
ratives of abuse are co-produced in the protection order process by
survivors and institutional service providers.241 Trinch shows how
paralegals working with Latina protection order applicants in a dis-
trict attorney’s office constrained survivors’ storytelling and reshaped
their narratives of abuse into linear witness accounts.242 Trinch notes
that this reshaping made survivors’ abuse narratives more palatable
to judges, and their protection order applications more likely to be
granted.243 However, the discursive practices of institutional service
providers also frustrated abuse survivors’ desire to be heard.244 This
study demonstrates how self-help programs can contribute to the con-
torting and curtailing of survivor accounts. Moreover, these practices
negatively impact not only individual applicants but also the greater
population of survivors and the community at large. Narratives about
abuse in protection order applications and other pleadings are an op-
portunity to educate courts about domestic violence and to counteract
prevailing stereotypes with the truth about survivors’ experiences.245
By contributing to constraints on applicants’ stories, self-help staff
members also curtailed this opportunity for reform.
CONCLUSION
Protection orders arose from a legal reform movement to address
the needs of battered women, and low-income women of color in
240. The possibility of a report was not disclosed to applicants before they received
services, which is an additional problem. MacDowell, Bellow Scholar Study, supra note 125.
241. See Trinch, supra note 120, at 497; Trinch & Berk-Seligson, supra note 121, at 412.
242. Trinch & Berk-Seligson, supra note 121, at 412.
243. Id. at 410–11.
244. Trinch, supra note 120, at 497; see SHONNA L. TRINCH, LATINAS’ NARRATIVES OF
DOMESTIC ABUSE: DISCREPANT VERSIONS OF VIOLENCE 57 (2003) (observing that the pro-
tection order system “is designed not to be receptive to change, but rather to alter those
narrative representations that challenge it”).
245. See Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When
She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 123 (2008) (explaining why advocates must
find ways to create space for new narratives that challenge stereotypes).
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particular.246 While applicants face structural barriers that raise
numerous concerns about access to justice, self-help may be part of
the problem rather than the solution.247 As demonstrated above, the
absence of advocacy does not mean the absence of influence over lit-
igants. The self-help staff members observed in this study regulated
the conduct of protection order applicants in subtle and not-so-subtle
ways that echo stereotypes about victims and perpetrators, and limit
access to some of the remedies considered most important by feminist
legal activists and reformers. These results suggest the need for a
coherent theory and practice of advocacy in self-help services, and
methods of accountability that address the potential for intersec-
tional bias.248 Self-help services should be centered on the needs of
applicants who are seeking relief from abuse and should help address
rather than amplify structural and systemic barriers to relief.249
This study also demonstrates the need for a broader research
agenda about access to justice. This agenda should include studying
how partnerships between advocacy organizations and the state im-
pact system advocacy as well as direct service delivery, and how both
are shaped by the organization of work within self-help centers.250
The data from this study suggest that self-help programs may create
new constraints on the supportive functions of traditional lay advo-
cacy. The demeanor of staff members is not only a set of behaviors
manifested in response to applicants, but is also shaped by the insti-
tutional settings within which staff members work.251 The regulatory
function of demeanor helped staff members to manage difficult en-
counters for which they were often ill prepared; their demeanor was
also constrained by the context in which it arose.252 Accordingly, in
a forthcoming article I analyze how the organization of work within
Programs A and B structured the expression of demeanor and de-
livery of services, and assess the relationship between organiza-
tional and system dynamics, and self-help.253 Research should also
246. See Goldfarb, supra note 11, at 1488.
247. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice, supra note 67, at 478.
248. See MacDowell, Improving Civil Legal Assistance, supra note 44 (arguing for the
importance of training civil court personnel about implicit bias); see also MacDowell, Re-
imagining Access to Justice, supra note 67, at 510 (arguing for a social justice advocacy
approach to legal services in family courts).
249. See Wan, supra note 159, at 630 (pointing out that the process of obtaining a
protective order should be empowering rather than demeaning).
250. See Jill Adams, The Civil Restraining Order Application Process: Textually Medi-
ated Institutional Case Management, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 185, 202–03 (2009) (describing how
the division of labor in a protection order process impacts how staff treat applicants).
251. See id. at 207–08.
252. See Wan, supra note 159, at 626–27 (arguing that the conditions in which services
are rendered should be considered).
253. MacDowell, From Victims to Litigants, supra note 230.
254 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 22:203
be conducted in other jurisdictions to learn if similar problems exist
and under what conditions.
Additionally, the findings above show that research about case
outcomes should examine whether applicants are applying for all of
the relief for which they are eligible, and if they are getting help with
all of the paperwork required for that relief. Researchers should also
examine the interplay of self-help and the larger web of legal and do-
mestic violence services. The programs in this study did little to miti-
gate the exposure of low-income applicants to potentially punitive
state processes, such as child welfare, nor to facilitate access to sup-
portive services like shelters or legal aid. Indeed, one of these pro-
grams may exacerbate some applicants’ exposure to unwanted state
interventions by reporting them to child protective services. Research-
ers should examine if other programs share these problems and how
they can be addressed.
Finally, access to justice researchers should move beyond cus-
tomer satisfaction to study how legal consciousness is constructed
within the institutional and social relationships of which self-help
is a part.254 The attitudes, actions, and experiences of litigants using
self-help services must be studied in context, and self-help critically
assessed from the position of those vulnerable to state power. Only
then can researchers fully ascertain the politics of self-help, and how
self-help services might be reformed to fit into the broader goals of
a social justice agenda for low-income people trying to access the
courts and end abuse.
254. See Silbey, supra note 124, at 338. Interviews with applicants are planned as part
of the next stage of this study.
